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Abbreviations and Glossary 
 
 
 Abbreviations
 
APG - Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní (Assembly of Guaraní People) 
 
CADEXNOR - Cámara de Exportadores del Norte (Chamber of Northern Exporters)  
 
CCCH - Consejo de Capitanes de Chuquisaca (Chuquisaca Captains' Council) 
 
CIDOB - Central Indígena del Oriente Boliviano (Indigenous Center of Eastern Bolivia) 
 
CIRABO - Central Indígena de la Amazonía Boliviana Indigenous (Center of the 
Bolivian Amazon) 
 
COB - Central Obrera Boliviana (Bolivian Workers' Central)  
 
CSUTCB - Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia 
(Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia)  
 
ILO – International Labor Organization 
 
INE – Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas (National Statistics Institute) 
 
INRA – Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria (National Agrarian Reform Institute)  
 
OEA - Organization of American States 
 
PROMASOR - Asociación de Productores de Maíz y Sorgo (Association of Corn and 
Sorghum Producers) 
 
UDAPE – Unidad de Análisis de Políticas Sociales y Económicas (Unit for Social and 
Economic Policies) 
 
UNHCR - United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
 
IACHR - Inter-American Commission on Human Rights  
 
 
Glossary  
 
Aguinaldo: Christmas Bonus 
 
Barracas: Areas where Brazil-nut harvesters live 
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Barraqueros: Brazil-nut concessionaires 
 
Barriadas: Rustic housing that Brazil-nut factory workers generally build and live in 
 
Barricas: Wooden boxes used to measure the amount of Brazil-nuts harvested. 
 
Campesinos: Peasants 
 
Chaqueo: A type of slash and burn agriculture 
 
Criollos: Direct descendants of Spanish and other European immigrants. 
 
Guaraní: Indigenous group prominent in the Chaco region 
 
Habilito: Working capital provided to workers in the form of food, supplies, and tools 
 
Haciendas: Ranches on which cattle, corn, and peanuts are produced 
 
Mestizos: Descendents of both criollos and indigenous Bolivians. 
 
Parceleros: Workers who inherited parcels of land from haciendas where they worked  
 
Payoles: rustic huts and silos where Brazil-nuts are temporarily stored 
 
Quebradores/as: Brazil-nut pod breakers or peelers, usually women 
 
Quechua: Indigenous group prevalent in the Amazon and Chaco regions 
 
Rescatadores: Intermediaries who provide workers with the habilito 
 
Sindicatos: Community collectives (not to be confused with unions) 
 
Tierra de comunidad: Communal lands 
 
Weenhayek: Indigenous group that lives in the Chaco region 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Verité carried out research on the presence of indicators to forced labor in the 
production of goods in seven countries from 2009 through 2011. Research was carried 
out on the production of shrimp in Bangladesh; Brazil-nuts, cattle, corn, and peanuts in 
Bolivia; sugar in the Dominican Republic; coffee in Guatemala; fish in Indonesia; rubber 
in Liberia; and tuna in the Philippines. The following report is based on research on the 
presence of indicators of forced labor in the production of Brazil-nuts in the Amazon 
region of Bolivia and the production of cattle, corn, and peanuts in the Chaco region of 
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Bolivia. This research was not intended to determine the existence or scale of forced 
labor in the regions and sectors under study, but rather to identify the presence of 
indicators of forced labor and factors that increased workers' vulnerability to labor 
exploitation. 
 
 
Objectives 
 
The primary objectives of the project were to: 
 obtain background information on Bolivia and the Amazon and Chaco regions 
(place, people, product, policies and programs); 
 create a methodology to study the presence of indicators of forced labor in 
production of Brazil-nuts in the Amazon region and cattle, corn, and peanut in the 
Chaco region; 
 identify and document indicators of forced labor among workers in the Brazil-nut 
sector in the Amazon region and cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Chaco 
region; 
 document the broader working and living conditions that Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, 
and peanut sector workers experience in the Amazon and Chaco regions; and 
 determine the risk factors for vulnerability to forced labor and other forms of 
exploitation in the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Amazon and 
Chaco regions. 
 
 
Context 
 
In order to gain an understanding of the social, economic, labor market, and cultural 
context of Bolivia, background research was carried out through a comprehensive 
literature and legal review and expert consultations. Bolivia is a country with a relatively 
high level of economic growth, which has failed to reach a large portion of the 
population. While Bolivia is the largest Brazil-nut exporter in the world, the vast majority 
of cattle, corn, and peanuts produced are for local consumption. Past research has 
found indicators of forced labor in Brazil-nut production in the Amazon region and in 
cattle, corn, and peanut production on haciendas in the Chaco region. The government 
has been active in combating forced labor, but has a limited capacity, especially in 
isolated areas, and problems remain in the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in 
the Amazon and Chaco regions. 
 
 
Research Methodology and Limitations 
 
Research in Bolivia was supervised by Verité's Latin America Coordinator and was 
managed by a Bolivian Research Coordinator. The research team also included a 
lawyer, four anthropologists, a psychologist, two linguistic experts, and bilingual local 
worker interviewers who spoke Spanish and indigenous languages. 
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Verité developed a mixed-methods research methodology to research indicators of 
forced labor in Brazil-nut production in the Bolivian Amazon region and cattle, corn, and 
peanut production in Bolivia's Chaco region. Verité carried out both qualitative and 
quantitative research, including literature review, expert consultations, a supply chain 
mapping, semi-structured interviews, focus groups, in-depth interviews, and a 
quantitative survey. Respondents were selected through non-probability sampling using 
convenience and snowball sampling techniques.  
 
Field research on Brazil-nuts began in the Amazon region in November 2009 with a 
rapid appraisal.1 This was followed by a quantitative survey administered to returned 
workers in their home communities in April and May of 2010. Over 300 worker 
interviews resulted in 273 valid surveys for the Brazil-nuts study. 
 
Field research on cattle, corn, and peanuts began in the Chaco region in October 2010. 
In-depth qualitative field research was carried out in the Chaco region from April to June 
2011. This was complemented by a quantitative survey carried out from May to 
September 2011. In total, over 750 worker interviews resulted in 601 valid surveys. 
Many workers interviewed worked in the production of more than one good. Therefore, 
537 corn producers, 278 peanut producers, and 233 cattle producers were surveyed. 
 
Challenges faced by the researchers included torrential rains and flooding, protests and 
road blocks, a serious car accident that resulted in the hospitalization of the 
researchers, and a violent assault of the Research Coordinator, which resulted in his 
hospitalization and a number of surgical interventions.  
 
Since this study is not statistically representative at the national or sectoral level, 
findings should not be generalized to the entire population. The study of Brazil-nuts was 
only focused on the Amazon region and the study of cattle, corn, and peanuts was only 
focused on the Chaco region, so the findings cannot be applied to other geographical 
areas. Nevertheless, researchers were able to obtain valuable, detailed information 
about the production of Brazil-nuts, cattle, corn, and peanuts, and the indicators of 
forced labor that are present in the production of these goods. 
 
 
Main Findings 
 
Verité investigated the presence of indicators of forced labor using International Labor 
Organization (ILO) guidance titled,“Identifying Forced Labor in Practice‖, which was 
published by the Special Action Program on Forced Labor in a 2005 report, A Global 
Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work.   
 
Research on Brazil-nuts in the Amazon region detected evidence of the presence of the 
following indicators of lack of consent: physical confinement in the work location, 
psychological compulsion (i.e. an order to work, backed up by a penalty for 
noncompliance), induced indebtedness, deception or false promises about terms of 
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work, withholding and non-payment of wages, and retention of identity documents. 
Research detected evidence of the presence of the following indicators of menace of 
penalty (the actual presence or threat of): physical violence against workers, sexual 
violence, supernatural retaliation, physical confinement, dismissal from work, exclusion 
from future employment, exclusion from community and social life, removal of rights and 
privileges, deprivation of food, shift to even worse working conditions, and loss of social 
status. Other issues of concern detected during research included excessive working 
hours, a lack of days off during peak periods, low wages, a lack of benefits, serious 
hazards to workers' health and safety, discrimination, poor living conditions, dangerous 
transportation, and child labor. Research detected risk factors that increased workers' 
vulnerability to forced labor amongst Brazil-nut harvesters and factory workers in the 
Amazon region. 
 
Research on cattle, corn, and peanuts in the Chaco region detected evidence of the 
presence of the following indicators of lack of consent: physical confinement in the work 
location, psychological compulsion, induced indebtedness, deception or false promises 
about terms of work, and withholding and non-payment of wages. Research detected 
evidence of the presence of the following indicators of menace of penalty (the actual 
presence or threat of): physical violence against workers, sexual violence, and loss of 
social status. Other issues of concern detected during research included excessive 
working hours, a lack of days off for workers in animal husbandry, subminimum wages, 
serious hazards to workers' health and safety, and child labor. Risk factors that 
increased workers' vulnerability to forced labor were detected amongst salaried workers 
and indigenous and peasant self-employed workers in the cattle, corn, and peanut 
sectors in the Chaco region. 
 
 
Background & Setting 
 
 
Places  
 
Bolivia comprises 1,098,581 square kilometers. Its population in 2012 was estimated at 
10,088,100 inhabitants. Sixty-seven percent of the population was urban and 33 percent 
was rural.2 
 
In 2011, the gross domestic product of Bolivia was estimated at USD 51.41 billion, 
representing the 92nd biggest economy in the world. In 2011, GDP per capita amounted 
to USD 4,800. Estimates from 2010 indicate that the agricultural sector comprised 12 
percent of GDP, industry comprised 38 percent, and the service sector comprised 50 
percent.3 According to a 2009 report, the projected growth of Bolivia's GDP in 2009 was 
the highest in the Western hemisphere.4 While the economy of Bolivia is growing, the 
benefits are not necessarily reaching all Bolivians, especially those who survive through 
subsistence agriculture, and increasing numbers of Bolivian workers are finding 
themselves living in poverty.5  
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The Bolivian economy is heavily dependent on informal, small scale enterprises and a 
subsistence economy. Sixty-eight percent of the economically active population in 
Bolivia was involved in informal economic activities in 2005, while ten percent of 
businesses in Bolivia generated 65 percent of the country's wealth in 2005.6  
In 2012, the United Nations Development Program's (UNDP) Human Development 
Index ranked Bolivia at 108 of 182 countries (up from 113 in 2007). In 2012, 14 percent 
of the population was judged to be living on less than USD 1.25 per day. Using the GINI 
coefficient, a measurement of the level of equality (with a score of zero meaning 
complete equality and 100 meaning total inequality), Bolivia received a score of 57.3.7 
 
The Amazon Region 
 
Geographically, the Amazon region of Bolivia comprises 70,000 square kilometers in 
the department of Pando, in the Vaca Diez province of Beni and in northern Iturralde 
province in the department of La Paz. The Amazon Region includes the entire 
department of Pando, which had a surface area of 63,827 square kilometers and an 
estimated population of 83,982 in 2011. In 2010, the gross revenue for Pando was close 
to BOB 313,150,000 (USD 98.8 million).  
 
According to the Bolivian government's National Statistics Institute (INE) and Unit for 
Social and Economic Policies (UDAPE), 72.4 percent of Pando's population lived in 
poverty, 91.5 percent of whom lived in rural areas. 8 The urban population is 
concentrated in the Nicolás Suárez province, containing the capital city of Cobija. In 
Manuripi, Madre de Dios, Abuna and Federico Román provinces, the percentage of the 
population living under the poverty line exceeded 92 percent. In Madre de Dios, the 
percentage of the population living under the poverty line reached 98.5 percent, of 
which 33.9 percent were moderately poor and 66.9 percent were in extreme poverty; 
while in Federico Román, 96.8 percent of the population was living under the poverty 
line, with 58.4 percent living in extreme poverty.9 
 
The Chaco Region 
 
The Gran Chaco is comprised of about 1,100,000 square kilometers, 50 percent of 
which is located in Argentina, 35 percent in Paraguay, and 15 percent in Bolivia. 10 The 
Bolivian region of Chaco is located between Rio Grande, Santa Cruz and Rio Bermejo, 
Tarija, comprising 127,755 square kilometers (11.6 percent of Bolivian territory). It 
comprises three departments (Santa Cruz, Chuquisaca, and Tarija), five provinces, and 
sixteen municipalities. The Incahuasi mountain range divides the Chaco region in two 
zones with strong differences in terms of social and political organization. The only land 
apt for agriculture is found at the foothills of the Eastern Andean Mountains in the three 
main valleys of Huacareta, Monteagudo, and Muyupampa. 
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People 
 
Bolivia has the largest percentage of indigenous inhabitants in the world. Close to 62 
percent of the Bolivian population identified themselves as indigenous in the 2002 
census.11 There are 34 indigenous groups in Bolivia, each with their own languages or 
dialects, traditions, religious practices, systems of social and political organization, and 
subsistence economies. Aymaras represent 25 percent of the total population; 
Quechuas comprise 30 percent; 38 percent of the population is Hispanic; and the other 
seven percent is distributed amongst the 32 other indigenous groups.12  
 
Despite having been subjected to conditions of servitude and slavery, as well as severe 
social discrimination and exclusion, the indigenous groups scattered throughout Bolivia 
have become increasingly empowered and politically active. It was this democratic civil 
consciousness that fostered the election of Evo Morales, the first indigenous President 
elected anywhere in the world. They are now in the process of obtaining increased 
social inclusion through what are known in Bolivia as “Social Organizations‖ 
(“Organizaciones Sociales”). Social Organizations have already succeeded in changing 
the Political Constitution of the State.  
 
There is also a migrant peasant culture with Aymara-Quechua roots. Their members are 
indigenous migrants from the Andean highlands who migrated into the lowlands as 
colonists. The groups are communitarian in nature, and are governed by agrarian 
sindicatos (community collectives).  These sindicatos are not unions (as their Spanish 
name may suggest), although they do organize and represent self-employed workers. 
They use the term sindicato due to their affiliation with the Bolivian Workers' Central 
(Central Obrera Boliviana -COB) a labor confederation originally for industrial workers, 
but which has also welcomed self-employed workers such as peasant farmers. Some 
are also affiliated with the Trade Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia 
(Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia – CSUTCB), the 
strongest indigenous and mestizo organization in the country. Peasant workers retain 
traditions from their places of origin, including dividing their land into two parts: one part 
for private use and the other for collective use, known as tierra de comunidad. Their 
culture is Andean but strongly influenced by mestizo and criollo culture. Almost the 
entire population is bilingual, learning their native language at home and Spanish in 
school.  
 
The third cultural group is the criollo-mestizo group. The criollos are the “pure blood‖ 
descendants of Spanish and other European immigrants who are very few in number. 
Due to mixing between criollos and indigenous Bolivians, mestizos emerged, with 
various gradations of mixture. This culture is stratified into a relatively small and 
predominantly light-skinned group that makes up the landed oligarchy, a large group of 
commercial and service sector workers, and another large group of blue collar and 
agricultural workers.  
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The Amazon Region  
 
There are three primary groups in the Amazon. Indigenous peoples, peasant migrants, 
and criollos/mestizos. There are a number of indigenous groups in the Amazon region, 
including:  
 the Araona group, with 112 residents in La Paz Department;13  
 the Cavineño group, with 1,677 inhabitants in Beni and Pando;14  
 the Chácobo Group, with 501 inhabitants in Beni;15  
 the Esse Ejjas group, with 939 inhabitants in Pando and La Paz;16  
 the Machineri group, with 155 nomadic inhabitants in Pando; 
 the Nahua group, with an undetermined nomadic population in Pando;17  
 the Toromona group, with no currently identifiable population, in La Paz;18 and 
 the Pacahuara group, with 25 inhabitants in Beni and Pando.19  
 
These groups form the indigenous culture of the Bolivian Amazon. Each group has its 
own language, but for meetings or assemblies with other groups, they use Spanish. 
Amazonian indigenous workers have organized through the Indigenous Center of the 
Bolivian Amazon (Central Indígena de la Amazonía Boliviana - CIRABO).20 This 
organization is a member of the Indigenous Center of Eastern Bolivia (Central Indígena 
del Oriente Boliviano – CIDOB), which is the strongest indigenous organization in the 
Bolivian lowlands. 
 
According to the Bolivian Institute of Foreign Trade, Brazil-nuts created 21,600 direct 
jobs and accounted for approximately three-quarters of economic activity in northern 
Bolivia in 2008. Overall, more than 50 percent of the total workforce in the region was 
linked to Brazil-nut production in 2005. Bolivian NGO data from 2005 indicates that 
12,000 workers were engaged in Brazil-nut harvesting, of which an estimated 8,400 
were salaried harvesters, 2,400 were peasant settlers, and 1,200 were indigenous 
workers. There were about 250 managers, 165 of whom were barraca owners and 85 
whom were rescatadores.21 In Brazil-nut processing factories, a total of 22 registered 
employers employed 9,244 workers, including 7,500 quebradores/as (75 percent of 
whom were women), 140 administrative employees, 64 technicians, 180 truck drivers, 
60 boat drivers, and 1,300 carriers.22 
 
There are two primary groups of workers in the Amazon Region: salaried employees 
and self-employed workers. Self-employed workers are comprised of indigenous 
peoples and peasant colonists who collect Brazil-nuts on land that was owned by the 
State and has been distributed to them through land grants. These State lands were 
also given as temporary concessions to barraqueros (rubber and Brazil-nut 
concessionaires) or were invaded by barraqueros and entrepreneurs who took 
advantage of the fact that the State had little authority in the region. These barraqueros 
and entrepreneurs employed salaried workers to work on the land and also forced 
workers to collect Brazil-nuts for them. 
 
Another important group in the Bolivian Amazon is urban workers, who make up the 
salaried workforce in the Brazil-nut industry. The urban population in the Amazon region 
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is estimated to comprise approximately 30,000 adult inhabitants and their respective 
family members. Most live in the city of Riberalta, but some also live in smaller urban 
areas like Cobija, in the Department Pando, or in Puerto Rico. These urban populations 
are comprised of indigenous peoples from the Amazonian jungle and peasants from 
other areas of the country who left their lands in order to make a living in the Brazil-nut 
industry. They carry out seasonal Brazil-nut harvesting as salaried harvesters and work 
in Brazil-nut processing (washing, boiling, peeling and packing, mainly for export). 
These urban workers are generally unionized and are mainly comprised of workers 
affiliated with the COB. 
 
At the other end of the spectrum is a group of entrepreneurs, who comprise the 
Chamber of Northern Exporters (Cámara de Exportadores del Norte – CADEXNOR).  
These entrepreneurs are primarily the owners of Brazil-nut factories that process the 
nuts. Factories export Brazil-nuts directly, sell their product to exporters, or sell their 
Brazil-nuts in the domestic market. Some owners of the processing plants continue to 
possess land grants, but due to the high level of social conflict created by the 
restructuring land grants, most private landowners have either abandoned their lands or 
are selling them to the indigenous people or peasant settlers.  
 
Barraqueros were granted land concessions and used to hire workers year after year to 
harvest Brazil-nuts, recruiting indigenous workers that populated the areas that had 
been given to them, in many cases subjecting them to exploitive conditions of work. 
They also hired migrant salaried workers that were debt bonded to the barraqueros. 
There are accusations of barraqueros giving kickbacks to politicians for land grants. 
However, a Legislative Assembly has replaced the National Congress in the 
administration of land concessions and the amount of State land that can be granted is 
gradually decreasing.  Furthermore, landowners have lost representatives in the 
Legislative Assembly and it is less likely now that senators can be bribed for land 
grants.  
 
A recent actor in the Brazil-nut processing industry is the State, which has established a 
State-subsidized public Brazil-nut processing facility that supplies Brazil-nuts for the 
domestic market. Brazil-nuts have also been included as a component of school 
breakfasts that are distributed free of charge in Bolivian schools. This facility pays 
Brazil-nut producers a better price than other processing facilities and as a result has 
succeeded in increasing the price of raw Brazil-nuts. The State has also been active in 
redistributing land in the Amazon region. 
         
The Chaco Region 
 
The main inhabitants of the Chaco region are the indigenous Guaraní and 
Weenhayek.23 The largest indigenous social group in the region is the Guaraní, which 
exerts hegemony over the other groups. The few remaining Tapietés live in southeast 
Bolivia, in the Gran Chaco province of Tarija Department.24 The indigenous population 
is essentially Guaraní in Chuquisaca, while in Santa Cruz and Tarija, peasant farmers 
are combined with indigenous Guaraní, Weenhayek, and Tapietés.  
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Founded in 1994,25 the Chuquisaca Captains' Council (Consejo de Capitanes de 
Chuquisaca - CCCH) is the main social organization in this area. CCCH is part of the 
Assembly of Guaraní People (Asamblea del Pueblo Guaraní - APG), which itself is 
affiliated with CIDOB. The CCHH is the strongest group in the region, and has 
representative authorities called Captains in each community under its jurisdiction. 
CCHH played a significant role in the research, as they allowed researchers to access 
Guaraní communities in the Department of Chuquisaca, as well as other departments. 
 
There is also a small population of peasant settlers from other regions that lives in the 
Chaco region of Chuquisaca. While there is a Union Federation of Peasant Workers 
(Federación Sindical de Trabajadores Campesinos) affiliated with CSUTCB, it has little 
contact with agrarian union leaders.  
 
According to data from 2005, the department of Chuquisaca has approximately 7,955 
inhabitants over 15 years of age who self-identify as Guaraní, while the region of Alto 
Parapetí has approximately 2,336 Guaraní inhabitants, representing 51 percent of the 
total population. 26 In 2010, there were an estimated 12,000 peanut growers in Bolivia, 
including 3,000 in the Chaco region.27 
 
 
Products 
 
Brazil-nut Production in the Amazon Region 
 
Brazil-Nut Production  
 
Brazil-nuts grow in the wild and have been known by the natives of the region since pre-
Columbian times. They were discovered by the European settlers in the early 19th 
century.28 Brazil-nuts are harvested during the rainy season. The industrial processing 
of Brazil-nuts includes boiling, drying, peeling and packaging for export.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  P a g e  | 15 
Brazil-nut Supply Chain in the Amazon Region29 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brazil-Nut Supply Chain in Pando30 
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Brazil-nut Production in the Amazon Region31 
 
 
 
In 2007, it was estimated that Bolivia had cornered 71 percent of the world's Brazil-nut 
market.32 The main export destinations in 2007 were the United Kingdom which 
received 43 percent of Bolivia's exports (8,192 tons), and the U.S. with 30 percent 
(5,867 tons).33 In 2009, Bolivia exported USD 73 million worth of peeled and unpeeled 
Brazil-nuts. In 2009, the UK was the main destination of Bolivian Brazil-nuts, 
representing 29 percent of Bolivia's Brazil-nut exports; followed by the U.S. and 
Germany with 28 percent and 26 percent respectively.34 Certified organic Brazil-nuts go 
for USD 19.40 per pound in the U.S. market.35 However, the rate of organic certification 
of Brazil-nuts is still relatively low.36  
 
Reports of Forced Labor in the Production of Brazil-nuts in the Amazon region 
 
The ILO reported in January 2005 that approximately 31,000 workers migrated 
seasonally to the Amazon to harvest Brazil-nuts, 5,000 to 6,000 of whom were 
subjected to forced labor.37 In May 2005, the Bolivian government acknowledged 
conditions analogous to slavery in the Amazonian and Chaco regions by stating that,
“effectively they are completely unprotected and the State is making efforts to try to 
implement some forms of protection, [and] is seeking consensus with the employers.‖38 
However, there have not been recent detailed reports on the systems that result in 
worker exploitation in the Brazil-nut sector in the Amazon region of Bolivia.  
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Cattle, Corn, and Peanut Production in the Bolivian Chaco Region 
 
In the Chaco region, the most important economic activity in terms of earnings is the 
hydrocarbons, which does not employ a large number of workers. The majority of the 
population is involved in cattle ranching and subsistence agriculture, including corn, 
peanut, and soybean production in the municipalities of Yacuiba, Caraparí, Villamontes 
Macharetí and Muyupampa.39  
 
Rainfall patterns limit production, generate food crises, and feed into the cycle of 
extreme poverty in the region.40 The scarcity creates the need for large tracts of land to 
feed cattle and limits agriculture to seasonal crops only viable in small ecological niches 
with enough available water. Global climate change worsens this fragile system with 
extreme periods of drought (the last one spanning from 2007 to 2010), which generate a 
permanent food crisis and foster increased population density in small areas and labor 
exploitation for food production. Periods of drought alternate with torrential rains (such 
as in 2011), which devastate the region and destroy roads. The Unidad de Riesgos de 
la Gobernación del Departamento de Chuquisaca (Risk Analysis Unit) released a 
warning in June 2010 announcing the onset of a food crisis in the Chaco region due to 
the severe drought. In some areas of the Chaco only ten to 20 percent of agricultural 
production remained viable, while in other regions there was reportedly no production.41  
 
Cattle Production 
 
Cattle production in the Bolivian Chaco began in 1589. Beginning in the 1970's, 
livestock production transitioned from being a subsistence activity to a commercial 
activity in the Chaco region. Livestock production is more widespread on the Chaco 
plains. It entails extensive land use and is highly dependent on vegetation but requires 
minimal investment in infrastructure.  However, low productivity continues to be a 
problem due to sanitation issues, poor pasture lands, inadequate infrastructure, and, 
especially drought.42  
 
According to June 2010 reports, the severe drought affecting the Chaco region was 
decimating cattle herds, with the most deaths occurring in the municipality of Villa 
Montes, Tarija and Carandaití, Chuquisaca.43 November 2010 reports revealed that the 
drought delayed crop planting, and that due to the chronic drought in the Bolivian 
Chaco, ranchers reported losses in the millions, from both the death of cattle and a lack 
of pasture land.44. Paradoxically, in December 2011 rainfall in the Chaco region 
surpassed the historical record, resulting in severe flooding.45 Due to these severe 
climatic fluctuations, livestock production in the Chaco region experiences severe ups 
and downs.  
 
Corn Production 
 
Bolivia has over 1,400 varieties of corn. Many indigenous corn farmers grow corn on 
small plots of land, producing enough corn for subsistence plus a small surplus. Low 
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yields are due to poor quality seeds, the absence of chemical or organic fertilizers, 
misuse of chemicals, and single crop farming.46  
 
The Association of Corn and Sorghum Producers (Asociación de Productores de Maíz y 
Sorgo - PROMASOR) reported that in 2008, 800,000 tons of corn were produced, 
700,000 tons of which were for the domestic market. However, production decreased by 
50 percent from 2008 to 2010.47 In 2010, only 50,500 hectares of corn were planted, 
which was expected to yield 118,000 tons of corn.48 In 2011, vegetable oil producers 
announced that they planned to plant more than 90,000 hectares and produce 360,000 
tons of corn.49  
 
Corn, in particular, has suffered from the crisis brought on by the acute and chronic 
drought affecting the region. Climate change has also caused an exodus of Guaraní 
families from the Chaco region. At the end of 2010, a drought struck, destroying at least 
60 percent of agricultural production on indigenous lands.  In 2011, the lack of rain 
wiped out 80 percent of corn production. Due a lack of corn for animal feed, World 
Vision sheep and chicken breeding projects in the region were forced to shut down.50  
 
Peanut Production 
 
In Bolivia, peanuts are planted between October and November and harvested in April 
and May. Immediately after they are harvested, the peanut pods are dried in the sun or 
artificially. Sun drying takes about two weeks.51  
 
In 2006-2007, 500 tons of peanuts were produced, representing a significant increase 
from the 130 tons harvested in 2004.52 Peanut yields in 2007 were approximately a half 
a ton per hectare.53 In 2008, producers were generally able to make a profit of USD 450 
to USD 500 per hectare.54 In 2008, 86 percent of peanuts were sold and 14 percent 
were used for household consumption.55  
 
Reports of Forced Labor in the Cattle, Corn, and Peanut Sectors in the Chaco Region 
 
Roipota Tekove, a diagnosis on living conditions of the Guaraní population of 
Chuquisaca published in 1996 by the CCHH, reported the existence of 773 captive 
families in 106 haciendas (estates) in the Chaco region, which produce agricultural 
products, including cattle, corn, and peanuts.56 However, in 1999, when another new 
CCCH diagnosis of living conditions was carried out, the captive population had 
decreased to 578 captive families on 121 haciendas, and 61 Guaraní settlements 
without their own land.57  
 
In 2004, a documentary from Spanish national TV (TVE) revealed the slave-like 
conditions under which indigenous workers lived on the Chaco estates. These reports 
were verified by the ILO,58 the IACHR, the World Organization against Torture,59 and 
regional leaders and local NGOs.60  
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In July 2005, the Ministry of Sustainable Development, through the Vice Ministry of 
Land, published a report on the “project for the liberation of captive Guaraní families 
and communities,‖ which estimated a total of 449 captive families in the Alto Parapetí 
region, and 200 families in the area of Huacareta, Chuquisaca.61 Another study was 
published in 2005 on two small provinces in Chuquisaca by the Defender of the People 
(el Defensor del Pueblo), the CCHH, the Indigenous Peoples' Project (Proyecto de 
Pueblos Indigenas), and the Ministry of Justice. This study indicated “the existence of 
situations violating the human rights of captive Guaraní families.‖62 The Defender of the 
People stated that, “in general, in the haciendas visited there was evidence of Guaraní 
families in debt bondage.‖ The report indicated that workers received advances of cash 
and/or in kind payments (usually used clothing and food) from landowners through 
verbal agreements and had to pay off these advances by working between ten and 12 
hours per day for BOB 5-15 per day, including food. The report also indicated that 
teenage boys and girls were “loaned‖ to landowners for a period of about a year in 
exchange for registering them in school. These young workers known as “  criados‖ were 
reportedly controlled by landlords from the time that they were very small children. In 
some cases, landowners were seen as father figures or “godparents,‖ which reinforced 
the relationship of dependency and subjugation.63 
 
Some more recent reports indicate that servitude continued to be an issue of concern in 
haciendas in the Chaco region. In June 2008, the Inter-American Commission of 
Human Rights released an official report in which it was stated that, “Guaní families 
under servitude or forced labor conditions are living in extreme poverty while being 
subjected to severe punishments such as whippings, burning of their crops and death of 
their animals.‖64 According to reports from the ILO, United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR), and Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), in 
2008 more than 167 Guaraní families lived in 13 cattle estates in Alto Parapetí under a 
regime of servitude, debt bonded labor, or under other conditions analogous to 
slavery.65 The UN denounced continued servitude in 2009.66 In March 2010, the APG 
reported that at least 1,049 families continued to live in conditions analogous to slavery 
in 44 communities in Southeastern Bolivia.67 In April 2010, the Organization of American 
States' (OEA) Commission of Human Rights reported that 600 Guaraní families from 
the Chaco region were being subjected to forced labor and servitude, and urged the 
State to “prevent, investigate and penalize these modern forms of slavery.‖68   In 
February 2011, 59 cases of servitude involving indigenous peoples were discovered in 
Caraparí and Yacuiba, Tarija Department, and 11 were identified in the province of 
Cercado.69  
 
 
Policies and Programs 
 
The Bolivian government has legal mechanisms to combat forced labor, and has been 
active in doing so, but has a limited capacity, especially in isolated areas. Bolivia has a 
legal framework to address land redistribution, which it has used to combat forced labor. 
The government may redistribute land to indigenous and peasant communities, 
including unused lands, lands that do not serve the common good, or lands on which 
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forced labor is being used. However, land redistribution has created a great deal of 
conflict, both in the Amazon and Chaco regions (See Appendix 1: Land Redistribution in 
Bolivia). Bolivia has a broad legal framework to address forced labor, human trafficking, 
and other forms of worker exploitation (see Appendix 2: Legal Framework). The 
government has carried out programs to combat forced labor with varying degrees of 
success, and problems remain in the Brazil-nut, cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the 
Amazon and Chaco regions 
 
In 2003, the government signed an agreement with the APG committing to form a 
“technical commission in charge of designing a project to free captive Guaraní 
communities in Alto Parapetí, and to provide them with enough land, with a minimum of 
50,000 hectares‖, and stating that “this   same commission will also consider cases from 
Ingre, Huacareta, Añimbo, Kaami, and others presented by APG‖.70 In 2005, faced both 
with a new central government role in the region and a changing balance of power, 
some landlords chose to recognize Guaraní captive families' rights to land, and allotted 
some land to them, although usually in places unsuitable for agriculture, and with an 
average of five hectares per family. In some cases, to prevent the National Agrarian 
Reform Institute (INRA) from granting Guaraní families their property rights, the 
landlords expelled them from their estates.71  
 
In 2005, the Defender of the People demanded that each Bolivian State agency carry 
out a number of measures to combat servitude among Guaranís in the Chaco region 
through the development of a comprehensive and sustainable strategy aimed to resolve 
the issue. The goals included guaranteeing Guaraní people the right to justice and 
human rights; regulation of the process of land redistribution; respect of the Guaraní 
people in the country's social, economic, and legal systems; the establishment of labor, 
social security, and child and juvenile labor courts in the Chaco region; immediate 
action by departmental and municipal authorities to ensure inhabitants' survival; and 
increased educational services.72 In December 2007, a Supreme Decree authorized the 
expropriation of 180,000 hectares of land in order to reconstitute the Guaraní territory.73  
 
These actions reduced the scale of forced labor, but there are regional variations within 
the Chaco region and these measures have failed to reach isolated areas. For example, 
Alto Parapetí comprises a valley circled by two mountain ranges. The main access 
points to Alto Parapeti consist of a river that runs through one of the mountain ranges 
and narrow paths, which makes it a very difficult place to access. This isolation has 
permitted estate owners to conceal the servitude the conditions of workers there.  
 
A 2005 study found that the State was not effective in protecting workers, resulting in 
the continued existence of labor exploitation, servitude, and debt bondage.74 In May 
2005, Bolivian government authorities openly recognized to an international news 
agency the existence of conditions analogous to slavery both in the Amazonian and 
Chaco regions and stated that the state would take measures to protect workers.  
 
A 2009 report entitled “United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues: Mission 
to Bolivia: Report and Recommendations‖ found a failure to comply with a number of 
international conventions, including ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labor. The study 
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stated that the State was weak in the Chaco region and that the Bolivian government 
must adopt urgent measures to combat child labor; restrictions on freedom of 
association and movement; systematic violence against indigenous peoples; the 
inability of indigenous people to obtain identification documents and the consequent 
exclusion from State benefits; discrimination; and a lack of impartiality of the judicial 
system.75 
 
A May 2009 UN Mission to the "United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues" recommended that the government:  
 guarantee the right to consent to working conditions to indigenous peoples, 
especially Guaranís; 
 strengthen its institutions in the Chaco region with respect to labor issues, 
security, and justice; 
 improve social dialogue in the Chaco region in order to eradicate forced labor 
and servitude; and 
 combat discrimination of indigenous peoples. 
 
The Ministry of Labor, in its annual report for 2009, noted that twenty inspectors were 
trained to work on the issue of forced labor and servitude, in order to implement a 
cooperative project with the Swiss government, "Presencia del Estado para la 
Restitución de los Derechos Fundamentales." The Ministry of Labor reported on the 
implementation of a database to quantify the incidence of forced labor and servitude 
through labor inspections in the areas of Chuquisaca, Santa Cruz, Tarija, Beni, and 
Pando. Follow-up inspections and monitoring work were carried out in Brazil-nut 
production areas, as well as on haciendas in the Chaco region in compliance with the 
recommendations of the United Nations and the Comprehensive Development Plan for 
the Guaraní Nation.76  
 
The Triple Seal (Triple Sello) is an instrument that was promoted by the Bolivian 
Foreign Trade Institute (IBCE) in coordination with the Bolivian Ministry of Labor, 
Employment and Social Security as a method of encouraging compliance with labor 
rights and the United Nations Global Compact. This seal would be awarded to 
companies that have demonstrated that they do not use child labor, discrimination, or 
forced labor in the entire production chain.77  
 
The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues has highlighted, "the steps taken by 
the Bolivian government to identify situations of servitude, forced labor, debt bondage 
and slavery of captive families."78  However, in 2010, the UN High Commissioner for 
Human Rights continued to state that Bolivia must implement necessary legislation to 
ensure that the rights of indigenous peoples were recognized and protected.79 
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Methodology & Limitations 
 
Verité's research in Bolivia aimed to assess the presence of, and circumstances 
surrounding, indicators of forced labor in sections of the supply chains for Brazil-nuts, 
cattle, corn, and peanuts.  
 
The following broad priorities guided the research: 
 identifying and documenting indicators of forced labor among workers in the 
supply chains for Brazil nuts, cattle, corn and peanuts in Bolivia 
 documenting the broader conditions experienced by workers in above-stated four 
supply chains 
 identifying risk factors for vulnerability to forced labor among workers in the 
above-stated four supply chains 
 
Research activities were supervised by Verité's Latin America coordinator and managed 
by a local Research Coordinator. The research team additionally included a lawyer, four 
anthropologists, a psychologist, two linguistic experts, and local worker interviewers 
who spoke Spanish and indigenous languages. 
 
Verité used a mixed methods approach, utilizing both quantitative and qualitative 
research techniques in order to ensure the triangulation of findings. The research 
commenced with a literature and legal review, expert consultations, and a rapid 
appraisal process, which included a mapping of the supply chain and the main actors 
involved and qualitative stakeholder interviews in order to rapidly obtain a working 
knowledge of the sector. Field research comprised qualitative and quantitative 
interviews, focus group discussions, and case studies. Upon completion of the field 
research, the data were collated, coded, and analyzed by the Research Coordinator 
and the research team. The responses to the questionnaire were analyzed according to 
ILO guidance on “Identifying Forced Labor in Practice,‖ described in the Presence of 
Indicators of Forced Labor section. The ways in which questions from the questionnaire 
were used to determine whether indicators of forced labor were present can be found in 
Appendix 9: Chart of Findings by Product. 
 
A report was then drafted and submitted to the research grant's Project 
Director/Principal Investigator, followed by further analysis and formatting by Verité 
using the guiding framework that was applied to all seven countries studied under its 
research grant. Verité also conducted a post-hoc analysis of data in all seven country 
studies by applying a larger set of forced labor indicators issued by the ILO in 
December 2011 (Hard to see, harder to count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate the 
Forced Labour of Adults of Children), which are intended for use in forced labor survey 
design and analysis but which were not available at the time the fieldwork was carried 
out. See Appendices 10 and 11 for a chart reflecting this analysis.   
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Research Design 
 
As noted in the Research Timing section below, the research on Brazil-nuts 
commenced first; followed by research on cattle, corn, and peanuts. While the timing for 
research of the various goods differed, the main phases and research processes did 
not.  
 
The research process for each supply chain began with an extensive literature review 
and series of expert consultations. For each supply chain under study, the literature 
review and initial expert consultations focused on the history of the production of each 
good and a mapping of the supply chain and the various workers involved, the 
geopolitical and economic history of each region to be studied, information on general 
working and living conditions and social/cultural/political history of inhabitants of the 
regions, and any history or previous evidence of labor violations or forced labor in the 
region or the production of the good. Sources consulted included academic journal 
articles, articles from newspapers and periodicals, and reports from government 
agencies and non-profits. An extensive legal review was also conducted, and included a 
review of all available legal documentation from domestic and international 
jurisprudence; constitutional law; and labor, agrarian, and criminal law.  
 
A thorough review of quantitative and qualitative research methods, particularly as 
regards research on vulnerable populations, was conducted.  
 
Finally, the research team was trained on the international and national legal 
instruments relating to forced labor and human trafficking; and Verité's frame of analysis 
for the study. In designing the research, the ILO definition of forced labor was used as 
the basis for developing all paths and methods of inquiry. Indicators of forced labor were 
identified, and initial research questions to capture those indicators were developed. 
The study was designed additionally to capture other indicators of exploitative 
conditions of work.  
 
Based on the outcomes of the desk review and expert consultations, geographic areas 
of focus were identified, and workers and employers were classified according to their 
location in the supply chain and the nature of the work performed.  
 
It was determined that different categories of workers should be established in order to 
differentiate between the experiences of salaried workers and self-employed workers 
(defined as laborers who work independently, producing and selling their products). 
Workers comprised both native indigenous people and peasant settlers who were self-
employed in production of Brazil-nuts, corn, peanuts, or cattle. The full range of workers 
included: 
 For self-employed workers: 
o Indigenous workers who hold collective land rights 
o Peasants who do not belong to an indigenous ethnic group with ancestral 
land rights, and whose land tenure is instead mediated through 
government land allocation.  
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o Workers who transport and process products in their own facilities 
 For salaried workers: 
o Permanent factory workers working in the industrial processing of 
products 
o Temporary workers or harvesters hired for a harvest 
o Piece workers or day-laborers who work from day to day without a 
contract 
o Contract workers engaged for a specific task 
o Permanent contract workers who acquire the status of employees; and  
o Workers who work and live on land they do not own 
 
Research instruments were developed for interviews that would yield both qualitative 
and quantitative data; focus groups and case studies; and a database for collecting and 
analyzing results for each good was designed. Researchers went into the field to 
interview workers and other key informants and stakeholders from employers, NGOs, 
unions, government and other institutions at the national, regional, and local levels.  
 
Based on the results of the desk research and rapid appraisals, the interview 
instruments were developed by the research team through several workshops. Two 
types of questionnaires were developed: one for self-employed workers and another for 
salaried workers. With respect to the supply chain for Brazil-nuts, for salaried workers, 
separate questionnaires were developed for Brazil-nut collectors, factory workers, and 
farm workers. The surveys were designed to collect information about worker 
demographics, paths of entry into employment, labor brokerage mechanisms, debt, 
indicators of forced labor, and other issues of concern (working and living conditions, 
harassment and abuse, child labor, etc.). 
 
Specific research questions for each sector and type of worker included:  
 questions designed to frame the inquiry, including: 
o classification of the worker and indication of place in supply chain 
o location of interview 
 questions designed to solicit basic demographic data on workers: 
o age 
o gender 
o highest level of formal education attained 
o marital status and household composition 
o ethnicity 
o languages spoken 
o status of land ownership for individual and his/her community 
o employment history 
 (for salaried workers) questions focused on the path of entry into current 
employment: 
o how information about the job was obtained  
o hiring procedure and any role for middlemen 
o employment agreement and presence of a verbal or written contract 
o evidence of contract substitution 
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o relations with or obligations to any union(s) 
o evidence of lack of consent, deception, fees paid, loans taken 
o other evidence of trafficking 
 questions designed to solicit information on existence and circumstances of debt 
o presence of debt, at beginning and end of harvest season 
o circumstances of debt – reason for and time of borrowing, interest, to 
whom debt is held, whether it acts as a binding agent, whether it is 
inherited 
o patterns of debt-taking, evidence of inherited debt 
o payment arrangements 
 questions designed to solicit information on transportation arrangements 
 questions designed to solicit information on working conditions 
o wages and payment mechanisms 
o hours of work (including evidence of compulsory/forced overtime) 
o health and safety 
o verbal/physical harassment 
o threats and reprisals 
o discrimination 
o termination of work relationship 
 questions designed to solicit information on living conditions 
 questions designed to solicit information on freedom of movement, including 
o geographic, physical or cultural isolation 
o presence of guards or other surveillance 
o ability/freedom to communicate with outside world 
 questions designed to solicit information on harassment, including evidence of 
o sexual harassment 
o verbal or physical harassment 
o supernatural or religious threat 
o other cultural, economic, or religious threat 
 questions designed to solicit information on presence and nature of child labor 
o demographic information on child laborers, and information on school 
attendance 
o information from parents on decision for child to work, entry into sector 
o working tasks and conditions of children 
o incidence of verbal, physical or sexual abuse 
 
The first drafts of the questionnaires were peer reviewed in the La Paz office and 
personnel were trained to ensure that they understood all of the concepts and data 
collection procedures. For the Brazil-nuts study, the questionnaires were tested in four 
workshops held with peasant harvesters, indigenous self-employed harvesters, salaried 
harvesters, and factory workers to ensure that the language was comprehensible, the 
questions were appropriate, and all issues were covered. Pilot testing of questionnaires 
was also carried out among self-employed workers in the cattle, corn, and peanuts 
sector in Monteagudo, causing the questionnaire to be redesigned and retested. For the 
cattle, corn, and peanut sectors, the questionnaires were also translated into Guaraní 
and Quechua. For the complete questionnaires, see Appendices 3 through 7. 
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Field researchers conducted interviews in pairs or trios, where one researcher was a 
trained anthropologist and the other, fluent in the necessary indigenous language(s) and 
culture(s). Female interviewers were included in the research teams to avoid gender 
bias in interviews and to complement the male researchers. All staff were trained and 
fully briefed to ensure their availability and ability to withstand the rigorous travel 
conditions.  
 
 
Brazil-Nut Research Methodology 
 
Research Timing 
 
Field research on Brazil-nuts was carried out from March 2009 through May 2010. 
Since workers were interviewed about their employment over the previous year, the 
research covered the period of March 2008 through May 2010. 
 
A research office in La Paz was established by the Research Coordinator and an 
administrative assistant was hired in March of 2009. A literature review for Brazil-nuts 
was conducted from March through October 2009.  
 
Brazil-nut harvest work is seasonal. The Brazil-nut harvest is an intensive process, 
lasting three months from mid-December to mid-March with remaining nuts being 
collected until mid-April.  
 
Field work unfolded in two phases: a rapid appraisal to inform the development of a 
quantitative survey supplemented by qualitative research.  
 
The rapid appraisal was initiated just before the harvest season began, in November 
and December of 2009. This is the time when harvest workers are typically recruited. 
The quantitative survey was administered to returned workers in their home 
communities, directly following the harvest, in April and May of 2010. The decision to 
administer the survey to returned workers in their home communities was made based 
on findings from the rapid appraisal that workers would be too busy and vulnerable 
during the intensive harvesting season to be able to participate in an in-depth 
quantitative survey. It was impossible to observe or engage with workers during the 
harvest without the express permission of, and supervision by, employers. Conducting 
the survey amongst returned workers ensured that workers would be comfortable and 
safe in engaging with researchers.  
 
For the rapid appraisal, researchers traveled to the Bolivian Amazon Region from 
November 11 to December 6, 2009. The trip from La Paz to Riberalta took two days, 
covering a distance of 912 km (567 miles) on a mountainous gravel road from La Paz to 
Yucumo, and to Llano de Yucumo in Riberalta.  
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In Riberalta, background interviews were conducted with management; labor 
representatives; local authorities; representatives of the Brazil-nut industry; indigenous 
peoples; public land license holders, locally known as barraqueros; transporters; Brazil-
nut harvesters, locally known as zafreros; representatives of the commonwealth of the 
Bolivian Amazon and the Municipal Government of Riberalta; and local NGOs; among 
others.  
 
These interviews were used to verify the findings in the desk research, and to secure 
the support of local authorities to allow the research to take place in their communities.  
 
To clarify the general conditions of life and work of Brazil-nut workers, Verité 
researchers held a series of workshops as follows: 
 One workshop was held in Riberalta city, with the leaders of the Brazil-nut 
harvesters' unions. Attendance included 14 representatives of seven unions, to 
which a great majority of the workers are affiliated.  
 A second workshop was held also in Riberalta city, for leaders of the unions of 
factory workers. Attendance included 14 representatives from 14 factories.  
 A third workshop was held in the Esse Ejja community of Portachuelo Medio, for 
indigenous leaders. Participants included representatives from each indigenous 
group that is part of the Indigenous Multiethnic Territory II and its directorate. 
(This comprises the Tacana, Esse Ejja, Machineri, Cavineño, Chacobo, and 
other smaller groups.) One hundred and fifty people attended the indigenous 
workshop.  
 Four workshops were held with representatives of peasants' unions, from the 
Federation of Peasant Workers of Beni and Pando. This included 14 members of 
the directorate of the federation and 14 representatives of the same number of 
peasant communities.  
 At each of the 25 indigenous and peasant communities visited, an initial 
workshop to introduce the research team and the purpose of the research was 
held in a participatory approach for all members of the community. The number 
of attendants varied from 12 to up to 60 participants, with an average of 18 adults 
and at least three times as many children.  
 
These workshops yielded critical information about the harvest and the industrial 
processing of Brazil-nuts; the participation of each of these groups of workers in the 
production chain; and the historical evolution of labor abuses in this industry. 
The quantitative survey instrument was designed based on the results of the rapid 
appraisal, from December 2009 through March 2010. As stated above, the survey was 
delivered in April and May 2010.  
 
Qualitative research was conducted after the harvest, to supplement the survey. Verité 
researchers arranged visits after the end of the harvest with the leaders of key Brazil-
nut producing communities. During these visits, the researchers went to the barracas 
and harvest trails where the Brazil-nut pickers worked and conducted contextual 
interviews with community leaders, guides, transporters, and Brazil-nut producers in 
their communities and where they were harvesting the nuts. Under these conditions, 
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researchers were able to conduct semi-formal meetings to analyze employment 
situations. In addition, casual interviews conducted with children and young people as 
informal conversations provided useful information on working conditions. Information 
yielded from these informal, qualitative interviews served as context and background for 
analyzing the results of the quantitative survey.  
 
Data processing and analysis were performed from June through November 2010. 
 
Research Location and Scope  
 
Research on Brazil-nuts was conducted in the Amazon region of Bolivia. Brazil-nuts are 
cultivated in the entire Amazon basin region, which extends from the foothills of the 
Cordillera Real or Oriental to the northeastern border with Brazil. The region covers the 
entire departments of Pando and Beni, the north and center of the department of La 
Paz, and the northern and central departments of Cochabamba and Santa Cruz.  
 
Verité's research study focused on the department of Pando, the Iturralde provinces in 
the northern La Paz department, and the Vaca Diez and Ballivian provinces in the 
department of Beni.  
 
In Pando, the study included: a) the municipalities of Nuevo Manoa, Villa Nueva and 
Santos Mercado in the Federico Román province; b) the municipalities of Santa Rosa 
and Ingavi in the Abuná province; c) the municipalities of G. Moreno, San Lorenzo, 
Sena, in the Madre de Dios province; d) the municipalities of Puerto Rico and San 
Pedro in the Manuripi province and the municipality of Filadelfia, which was not visited 
but was investigated indirectly; e) the Nicolás Suárez province, in which the 
municipalities of Cobija, Bolpebra and Porvenir were also not visited but were studied 
indirectly through informants who came from these areas. Rural and indigenous 
communities and townships in twelve of the fifteen municipalities in Pando were visited.  
 
In the department of Beni, the study included the municipalities of Riberalta and 
Guayaramerín in the province of Vaca Diez. In the department of La Paz, the 
municipality of Ixiamas, in the province of Iturralde, was studied indirectly.  
 
Overall in the Amazonian region, fifteen municipalities were studied, 12 through direct 
visits and three indirectly through informants from these areas (See Appendix 8: Worker 
Interview Locations). 
 
In Pando and Beni, contextual interviews were carried out in three major urban centers 
including the cities of Riberalta, Cobija and the township of Puerto Rico, as follows:  
 In Riberalta, nine background interviews were held: one with the president of 
CADEXNOR, the Brazil-nut exporters association; another with the president of 
the Barraqueros' Association; another with the president of MANUNAB, the 
association of municipalities of the Amazonian region of Bolivia; three with local 
NGO's representatives; one with the president of the Peasant Cooperative; one 
with a member of the Municipal Council of Riberalta and the last one with the 
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local officer of the Ministry of Labor.  
 In Cobija four background interviews were held: one with a factory owner and 
another with an INRA officer, another with a member of the Federation of 
Peasants of Pando, and the last one with a person who was present at the time 
of the Massacre of Filadelfia and Porvenir (a civil confrontation of members of the 
local government and indigenous and peasants who attempted to defend the 
regional office of INRA).  
 In Puerto Rico, two background interviews were held: one with the owner of a 
local factory and the other with the administrator of the dock.  
 In each location, researchers also held community workshops to analyze the 
social, economic and labor conditions related to Brazil-nut production.  
 
Ten exploratory trips were made to 25 indigenous and peasant communities. At each 
community, a number of Brazil-nut harvest paths were visited, with one to five payoles 
per path. (A payole is a rustic silo where Brazil-nuts are temporarily stored.) A total of 
112 payoles were visited to gather direct evidence of the general working conditions, 
and more specifically, evidence of forced labor in Brazil-nut collection.  
 
Twenty-seven case studies were conducted to illustrate processes of hiring, working 
and termination of work, including three studies on salaried Brazil-nut harvesters, five 
on peasant Brazil-nut harvesters, four on indigenous Brazil-nut harvesters, and three on 
factory workers. These case studies provided general portraits of the types of workers. 
The remaining twelve illustrated specific issues related to vulnerability to forced labor 
conditions, such as indebtedness, isolation, mechanisms of coercion and so on.  
 
For the study of Brazil-nut production in the Amazon region of Bolivia, over 300 surveys 
were administered to returned workers, which yielded 273 valid surveys after evaluation 
of the data. The surveys of Brazil-nut harvesters and the verification of findings through 
expert consultations and qualitative interviews were performed during research trips to 
the barracas in the Department of Pando, and in the Vaca Diez province of the 
Department of Beni in northeast Bolivia. The surveys of laborers returned from the 
harvest and of factory workers were carried out in the city of Riberalta in Vaca Diez 
province, in the Department of Beni, the geopolitical center of the Amazon region and 
the industrial and commercial center of Brazil-nut production; in the city of Cobija, 
capital of Pando Department; and in Puerto Rico, a town with a Brazil-nut processing 
plant. Researchers conducted interviews with workers from the five provinces in the 
department of Pando and its 15 municipalities, one municipality in the Iturralde province 
in the North of the department of La Paz, and two municipalities in the province Vaca 
Diez in Beni, for a total of eight provinces and 18 municipalities. The research targeted 
self-employed indigenous and peasant workers and salaried harvesters and factory 
workers. 
 
Sampling and Access 
 
The population working in the Brazil-nut industry in Bolivia is concentrated in the 
Amazon region, which is the area covered by this study. The total population involved in 
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Brazil-nut production in 2010 was 151,933, including workers and their family members, 
as Brazil-nut harvesting involves the whole family, including children.80 As the average 
size of each family is 5.6 people per family, one can surmise that there are 
approximately 27,131 families involved in Brazil-nut production.81 There were 
approximately 21,600 heads of household or “account owners‖ that worked in Brazil-nut 
production in 2005.82 The sampling plan relied on this assumption. While researchers 
ensured that the sample captured both permanent and temporary workers who worked 
in all of the Brazil-nut producing municipalities and companies, no quotas were applied, 
so the sample was not proportional to the number of temporary and permanent workers 
employed in each municipality and company. 
 
Over 300 individual members of households were interviewed, resulting in 273 valid 
surveys. Surveys were deemed “ind‖ if the interviewers determined that the workers 
did not work in the sector under study, if the workers worked in regions outside the area 
of study, or if the information was incomplete (the respondent did not finish the interview 
or did not want to provide key information). This did not affect the validity of the findings. 
For this study, workers were broken down into two categories: salaried workers who 
work for employers and self-employed workers who sell their Brazil-nuts. Salaried 
workers include harvesters and factory workers, mainly quebradores/as who are 
generally female workers who break/peel the Brazil-nuts. Self-employed workers 
include indigenous workers and peasant settlers who work on their own land or 
communal lands. Estimates from 2005 indicate that there were 8,400 salaried 
harvesters; 7,500 salaried factory workers; 1,200 indigenous self-employed harvesters; 
and 2,500 peasant settler harvesters.83 
 
These four groups of workers were covered by the sample. Of the 273 workers 
surveyed: 
 74 (27 percent) were salaried harvesters;  
 92 (34 percent) were salaried factory workers, including 22 permanent workers 
and 70 temporary workers; 
 39 (14 percent) were self-employed indigenous harvesters; and 
 66 (24 percent) were self-employed peasant settler harvesters. 
 
The quantitative sample was a nonrandom, convenience sample. Researchers ensured 
that the sample included workers who had worked in all of the various municipalities in 
which Brazil-nut harvesting takes place. Researchers further intended for the sample to 
capture the full spectrum of contracting relationships, including workers who worked 
directly with barraqueros, workers who worked for managers used by the barraqueros 
or Brazil-nut processors, workers hired by rescatadores (irregular or intermediary 
subcontractors) to work on indigenous or peasant lands, workers who worked directly 
for the peasants or indigenous landowners, and workers hired by indigenous or 
peasants' leaders to work on communal land or collective property. 
 
Workers to be interviewed were selected through snowball sampling. Workers were 
interviewed in their home communities, in areas surrounding Riberalta and Cobija. 
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Individuals were identified for interviewing through networking with community 
members.  
 
For factory workers, the quantitative sample was also a nonrandom convenience 
sample; and researchers ensured that the sample included workers from all companies 
involved in the processing of Brazil-nuts and that both temporary and permanent 
workers were interviewed. Factory workers were similarly identified for interviewing 
through snowball sampling.  
 
Interviews with factory workers initially took place at their homes; but it became clear 
that workers were not comfortable. It was then decided to interview workers privately, at 
hotels. But this, too, proved problematic. Local Brazil-nut factory owners became aware 
of the research, and local community actors who were helping to facilitate the research 
began to fear reprisals. Therefore, Verité determined that it was becoming too risky for 
researchers and workers alike, and pulled out of Riberalta.  
 
A total of 273 valid surveys were administered to 66 self-employed peasant harvesters, 
41 self-employed indigenous harvesters, 74 salaried harvesters, and 92 factory 
workers.  
 
Data Processing and Analysis 
 
Data processing and analysis for Brazil-nuts was performed from June through 
November 2010. Survey data was entered into the quantitative database. Transcripts of 
taped interviews, records of qualitative information from surveys and case studies, and 
the notes taken in the workshops were incorporated in the qualitative documentation. 
Quantitative and qualitative data were then analyzed according to Verité's framework for 
evaluating forced labor indicators and vulnerabilities, based on ILO indicators of forced 
labor.  
 
 
Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts Research Methodology 
 
Research Timing 
 
Field research on cattle, corn, and peanuts was carried out from October 2010 through 
September 2011. Since workers were interviewed about their employment over the 
previous year, the research covered the period of October 2009 through September 
2011. 
 
Research in Bolivia was expanded in April 2010 to include the production of cattle, corn 
and peanuts in the Chaco region. The research protocols developed for Brazil-nuts 
were adapted for the inquiries into cattle, corn and peanuts.  
 
A literature review and expert consultations were performed from June through August 
of 2010.  
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Corn and peanut production has an annual production cycle, while cattle herding is an 
ongoing process. The cultivation of corn and peanuts depends on climatic conditions, as 
the areas of production generally lack reservoirs and irrigation facilities. There are two 
periods of labor intensive cultivation for corn and peanuts. First the land must be 
prepared and planted, which takes place between September and November, 
depending on the spring rains. Second, there is the harvest season, which lasts from 
March to May. In cattle ranching there is a fattening season during the late December to 
mid-March rains. This is the time when the white carob shrubs (Prosopis alba) provide 
food for the cattle.  
 
Research was designed in two phases: a rapid appraisal phase, in which complaints of 
forced labor were investigated and the survey designed; and a quantitative and 
qualitative research phase.  
 
The original plan was for the rapid appraisal phase to occur before the peak harvest, 
and for the quantitative and qualitative research to be conducted during peak harvest. 
As will be explained below, this schedule was revised slightly based on unforeseen 
research challenges.  
 
From October 23rd to December 14th, 2010 the team made initial visits to the Chaco 
region. One of the initial tasks was to seek out two linguists to support the study. A 
Quechua linguist was recruited in Cochabamba, and a Guaraní linguist in the Chaco 
region. Research then began in Monteagudo.  
 
The team then had a serious car accident in which several team members were injured. 
While arranging for the medical care and a new vehicle, the team was stranded in 
Camiri, where the researchers used their time to carry out contextual interviews with 
executives of the APG and the Teko Guaraní NGO to seek their support in the 
investigation.  
 
Project activities then resumed, with travel from Camiri to Monteagudo, the seat of the 
Chuquisaca Council of Captains. The process of securing authorization from the 
Guaraní Captains of Chuquisaca took two weeks, during which the team had to remain 
in Monteagudo. While waiting for authorization, the researchers conducted research on 
working conditions in peanut, corn, and cattle production in the municipalities of 
Monteagudo and Muyupampa with the rural population of self-employed indigenous 
Guaraní, and Quechua workers, who the researcher determined did not exhibit 
indicators of forced labor.  
 
Continuing in a single vehicle, the team carried out interviews on indicators of forced 
labor in Tarija and Santa Cruz with a downsized team of three permanent researchers 
and a guide.  
 
Verité researchers obtained permission to do research in the three departments under 
study from the Council of Captains of the Guaraní people, the Weenhayek, and the 
independent farmers' unions. Researchers also carried out background interviews, 
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through which they identified the areas associated with reports of indicators of forced 
labor.  
 
Rapid appraisal data collection was scheduled to begin in February 2011; however, it 
was delayed because after three years of drought in the Chaco region, torrential rains 
struck from late January until mid March. The unpaved and narrow access roads to 
towns and communities became impassable. Therefore, during February and March 
researchers carried out an in-depth literature review.  
 
Despite the severity of the rains and the bad road conditions, roads again became 
passable in 4-wheel drive light vehicles in April 2011, at which time the researchers 
began the process of gathering information. The first stage of data collection lasted 70 
days, from April 4 to June 6, 2011, with two teams traveling in separate vehicles. Each 
team included a male and female researcher, a trained male and female Guaraní 
interviewer, a local guide, and a driver in charge of logistics.  
 
The survey phase of research took place from May 1 to September 24, 2011, during 
which researchers were able to interview a larger number of workers.  
 
The processing of information collected in the survey phase took place from September 
to late October 2011.  
 
Research Location and Scope 
 
The study focused on the Chaco region because this area includes all three products 
and because it has been the target of international allegations of conditions 
approximating forced labor. The Chaco region includes the provinces of Luis Calvo and 
Hernando Siles in the Department of Chuquisaca, the provinces of Gran Chaco and 
O'Connor in the Department of Tarija, and the province of Cordillera in the Department 
of Santa Cruz. There are a total of 16 municipalities, of which 15 were included in the 
study, with one being excluded due to the reluctance of local authorities to participate.  
 
Of the 184 communities in Chuquisaca, only the community of Tentapiao was excluded 
from the investigation because it has never been extensively visited by non-Guaranís. 
Verité researchers visited 24 communities in Huacareta; 16 in Ingre, 27 in Monteagudo, 
eight in Muyupampa, 16 in Igüembe, and 13 in Huacaya, for a total of 104 communities 
visited in the Department of Chuquisaca.  
 
Of 145 registered communities in Villamontes, Verité researchers visited four 
Weenhayek indigenous communities and six mixed and Guaraní communities, for a 
total of ten communities visited in Villamontes.  
 
Verité researchers also visited 23 mixed communities in Yacuiba, and 12 in Caraparí, 
making a total of 45 communities visited in the Chaco of the Department of Tarija.  
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Of the 80 registered communities in the Cordillera province of Santa Cruz Department, 
Verité researchers visited five in Camiri, eight in Charagua, 12 in Gutierrez, four in 
Lagunillas, two in Boyuibe, and six in Cuevo, for a total of 37 communities.  
 
In conclusion, of the 409 registered communities in the geographic area covered by the 
study, Verité researchers visited 186 communities (45 percent). Of the 184 communities  
in Chuquisaca, Verité researchers visited 104 (57 percent); of the 145 in Tarija, Verité 
researchers visited 45 (31 percent); and of the 80 in Santa Cruz, Verité researchers 
visited 37 (46 percent). For a detailed chart of the number of workers interviewed in 
each location, see Appendix 8: Worker Interview Locations. 
 
The rapid appraisal phase investigated complaints that had been made by the Captains 
of the Guaraní People's Assembly involving indicators of forced labor in the most 
remote areas. Research began in Lagunillas, Santa Cruz in rural communities and then 
moved to the three deep valleys of the Chaco region of Chuquisaca: the valley of 
Monteagudo and Rosario del Ingre, the valley of Muyupampa and Igüembe, and the 
valleys of Huacareta and Uruguay. The teams then moved to the plains to undertake 
research in the Huacaya valley and in Cuevo, Santa Cruz. Teams then proceeded north 
to Camiri to secure the support of the Captains' Council of Santa Cruz; moved on to 
Charagua; returned to cover Boyuibe, south of Santa Cruz; entered the plain towards 
Macharetí Chuquisaca, emerged into the Gran Chaco of Tarija Department, and 
traveled through Villamontes, Yacuiba, and Caraparí. From this point the teams 
returned to Yacuiba. On the way back to La Paz, researchers carried out research in the 
municipality of Gutierrez. All complaints were investigated along with an active search 
for additional indicators of forced labor. However, due to the remoteness of many 
haciendas, the poor roads, and the fact that many had been abandoned due to the 
previous three years of drought, a lower number of workers were interviewed than 
expected. 
 
For the quantitative study, over 750 workers were interviewed, a total of 601 of whose 
surveys were judged to be valid. Surveys were deemed “invalid‖ if the interviewers 
determined that the workers did not work in the sectors under study, if the workers 
worked in regions outside the area of study, or if the information was incomplete. This 
did not affect the validity of the findings. 
 
Sampling and Access 
 
The population living in the Chaco region covered by this study was estimated at 21,681 
in 2009. The population was comprised of approximately 3,870 families.84 Interviews 
were carried with one member of each family. Therefore, the 601 valid surveys carried 
out covered approximately three percent of the population and 16 percent of the total 
number of families in the region under study. 
 
Agricultural production is undergoing a process of rapid change in the Chaco region due 
to land redistribution and drought (see Background and Setting). Therefore, the labor 
force is also changing rapidly, with a large number of workers changing jobs and/or 
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working in cattle, corn, and peanut production simultaneously, as these products are 
produced on the same haciendas or individual or communal lands; and/or have different 
harvesting/production seasons, allowing workers to work in different sectors at the same 
time or at different times of the year. Therefore, rather than analyzing data based on the 
sector that workers worked in, researchers split cattle, corn, and peanut workers into 
two categories: salaried workers and self-employed workers.  
 
The study was carried out in two phases. The first phase was the in-depth phase, during 
which 62 salaried workers and 71 self-employed workers were interviewed, for a total of 
133 surveys. Among the self-employed workers, 42 indigenous workers, 26 peasant 
settlers, and three parceleros (workers who had inherited parcels of land from the 
haciendas they had worked on) were interviewed. Indigenous workers came from the 
Guaraní and Weenhayek indigenous groups. During this phase, hacienda owners and 
capitanes guaraníes were interviewed in each community. 
 
Verité made a determination that 133 surveys were insufficient for the number of 
workers employed in the area under study, as the sample size was too small. Therefore, 
a second phase of surveys was planned and carried out. During this phase, 404 
surveys were implemented, including interviews of 326 self-employed workers and 78 
salaried workers. It is important to note that the majority of self-employed workers 
interviewed had been working on haciendas for less than three years.  
 
Workers were selected for interviews using nonprobability convenience sampling. They 
were interviewed in their place of work or communities. Interviews were carried out in 
Guaraní and Spanish. 
 
Between both phases of the study, over 750 workers were interviewed, and 601 surveys 
were judged to be complete and valid. Of those surveyed, 537 worked in corn 
production, 278 worked in peanut production, and 233 worked in cattle production. 
Given that the vast majority of workers worked in the production of two or more 
products, most surveys provided information about more than one product.  Of the 537 
corn producers interviewed 140 (26 percent) were salaried workers and 397 (74 
percent) were self-employed. Of the 278 peanut producers interviewed, 102 (37 
percent) were salaried and 176 (63 percent) were self-employed. Of the 233 cattle 
producers, 100 (43 percent) were salaried and 133 (57 percent) were self-employed. 
The sample size was determined based on INE data on the population of the Chaco 
region linked to the production of each good. More self-employed than salaried workers 
were interviewed, as self-employed workers comprised the majority of the workforce.  
 
Of 601 worker interviews for cattle, corn and peanuts, 70 percent took place in private 
and 30 percent in the presence of others, usually family members. The comfort and 
credibility of the informants was judged by researchers to be high.  
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Data Processing and Analysis 
 
The processing of information collected in the survey phase for cattle, corn, and 
peanuts took place from late September to late October and followed the procedures 
described above for the data processing for Brazil-nuts.  
 
From November 1 until December 15, 2011, the research team consolidated and 
tabulated the data for the four products under study and completed the qualitative 
analysis of case studies.  
 
This work was carried out by the Research Coordinator, the Fieldwork Coordinator, a 
researcher who participated in the entire study, and an expert in quantitative data 
processing.  
 
 
Challenges and Limitations 
 
Challenges 
 
In October 2010, in the vicinity of Mocomocal, one of the research team's vehicles 
suffered a full rollover when the narrowness of the road and an oncoming truck made 
the car hit a large hole at the edge of the pavement. The car was totaled and members 
of the research team suffered injuries, including a broken rib, and chest and abdominal 
compression caused by seatbelt pressure. The injured members of the research team 
were treated at the Emergency Room in the Camiri Hospital, then in the city of Santa 
Cruz, and additionally in La Paz when they returned home. This accident caused a ten 
day delay to the project's field activities, unanticipated expenses, the loss of one of two 
vehicles contracted for the research, and the loss of two members of the research team 
due to the trauma of the accident.  
 
Severe rains in the spring of 2011 slowed the research on cattle, corn, and peanuts; as 
did a delay in securing approval from community leaders to conduct the research.  
The Research Coordinator was the victim of a violent assault in La Paz in the spring of 
2011 that resulted in two surgeries and necessitated scheduling and team composition 
changes for the survey portion of the cattle, corn, and peanuts research. 
 
During field research in September 2011 in Santa Cruz, due to road blocks and 
widespread protests over a government plan to build a road through protected lands, 
the research team was temporarily cut off and had to return to La Paz earlier than 
expected during a two-day temporary standstill of the protests. Fortunately, researchers 
had been ahead of schedule and were able to obtain more than 100 interviews per 
product during another field visit.  
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Limitations 
 
The study was not designed to be nationally representative in a statistically significant 
sense, and no claims are made for it in this regard. The ILO has recently noted the 
numerous difficulties associated with meaningful sampling of populations potentially 
involved in forced labor.85  
 
A key limitation of this study was its reliance on a non-probability sample. While efforts 
were made by researchers to get a cross section of worksites and categories of 
workers, non-random sampling methods were used in the selection of both interviewees 
and research sites, and sample sizes were basically arbitrary. A key limitation of 
convenience sampling is that the most “hidden‖ or hard to access workers may be those 
who are most vulnerable to forced labor conditions. 
 
Women and children, in particular, were undersampled in the research due to cultural 
restrictions on engaging with researchers, although data were collected from men about 
their families, partially offsetting this limitation. The research was importantly limited by 
the inability to conduct open, private and unhindered interviews with some categories of 
workers due to security concerns and impediments to access.  
 
The study of cattle, corn, and peanuts was focused in the Chaco region because of the 
existing reports of forced labor in this region and because of the budget limitations that 
precluded the extension of the study to other regions where cattle, corn, and peanuts 
are produced. Therefore, the study of cattle, corn, and peanuts is only applicable to the 
Chaco region and cannot be considered to be representative of the production of these 
goods throughout Bolivia. 
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Research Findings 
  
The categories for indicators of forced labor are based upon the ILO's guidance on
“Identifying Forced Labor in Practice,‖ which are broken down into lack of consent and 
menace of penalty, as shown below.86 Information about wages and hours has also 
been included, as wage and hour violations may constitute indicators of forced labor. 
Although the presence of these indicators signals an increased risk for forced labor, 
each case must be assessed individually to determine the interplay of indicators and the 
context to determine whether or not it rises to the level of forced labor. The following 
findings are based on worker interviews, as well as researchers' direct observations, 
expert consultations, and a comprehensive literature review.87  
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Brazil-Nuts-Demographic Characteristics 
  
In this study on the working conditions and indicators of forced labor in Brazil-nut 
production in the Amazon region of Bolivia, researchers implemented more than 300 
surveys, which yielded 273 valid surveys after evaluation of the data.  
 
 
Gender 
 
Of the 273 workers surveyed, 96 (35 percent) were female respondents and 177 (65 
percent) were male. Most Brazil-nut harvesters were male, indigenous heads of 
household who come from the campesino (peasant) class. In the interviews, male 
harvesters answered questions about their wives or partners who also worked in the 
harvest. However, the majority of factory workers in the Brazil-nut processing facilities 
were women and the sampling system took this into account.  
 
 
Age  
 
The average age of male and female workers was 37. Workers were generally young 
due to the extreme nature of work in the jungle and the long hours in factories, which 
require physical strength and endurance.  
 
Seven workers under 18 were surveyed, comprising three percent of workers 
interviewed. However, by collecting information from adults working alongside minors, 
the researchers were able to verify that 133 minors were working with their parents or 
guardians, including 14 children under six years of age, 75 children between seven 
and14 years of age, and 44 minors between the ages of 15 and 18. 
 
 
Marital Status 
 
The rate of legal marriage in the Amazon region is low. Therefore, researchers sought 
to find out the percentage of workers who were either married or in stable relationships 
(in which they shared a home and expenses). Of the 273 workers surveyed, 201 (74 
percent) reported being married or in stable relationships.   
 
 
Children  
 
Of the 273 respondents 200 (73 percent) reported that they had children, approximately 
equivalent to the number reporting that they were married or in stable relationships. 
Workers' families were large and on average, each worker surveyed had seven 
children.  
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Education 
 
The educational level of workers surveyed was low. On average, surveyed workers had 
completed only four years of schooling. This correlates with a high rate of illiteracy.  
 
 
Language and Ethnicity 
 
All respondents spoke Spanish, which shows a high degree of Hispanization of the 
population. However 76 (28 percent) of respondents were bilingual and were from a 
number of ethnic groups.  One worker surveyed reported that he was Esse Ejja, another 
was Chácobo, and 23 (eight percent) were Tacanas.  Workers from the Cavineños and 
Machineris ethnic groups were not interviewed.  Furthermore, researchers interviewed 
three Quechua workers from the intramontane valleys, and eight Aymara workers from 
the Andes, which demonstrates migration from the highlands to the Amazonian region.  
 
 
Employment Status 
 
All workers interviewed involved in Brazil-nut harvesting were temporary, with contracts 
lasting only as long as the three to four month harvest. In the Brazil-nut processing 
plants about 24 percent of workers interviewed were permanent workers, while the 
remaining 76 percent are temporary workers. Of the 76 percent of temporary workers, 
more than 70 percent consisted of the pod breakers (quebradoras) - women in charge 
of breaking and removing the hard pod of the Brazil-nut and exposing the kernel which 
is the edible and exportable product. These temporary female laborers work an average 
of three months in the processing plants.  
 
 
Brazil-Nuts-Privacy and Credibility 
  
Of the 273 workers surveyed, 148 (55 percent) were carried out in private. For the 
remaining 45 percent, there were bystanders, including family members or neighbors 
who were also workers and who sometimes contributed to the interview by supporting 
or complementing what the interviewee said, but this could also have introduced some 
bias. Workers were generally comfortable and outgoing. However, in a few cases, the 
fear of being involved in the most serious allegations of exploitation made workers more 
reserved, and in two cases workers displayed evident and severe intimidation. 
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Brazil-Nuts-Presence of Indicators of Forced labor 
 
 
 
Lack of consent to (involuntary nature of) work, (the “route into” forced labor) 
Birth/Descent into “Slave” or Bonded Status 
 
No evidence was obtained regarding the existence of people who were born into 
bondage and slavery in the Brazil-nut industry.  
 
Physical Confinement in the Work Location  
 
Of the 273 respondents, 69 (25 percent) stated they did not feel free to leave their 
workplace. Forty-seven workers (17 percent) reported that they were denied leave, 
including both harvesters and factory workers. In addition, 27 workers (20 percent), all 
of whom were harvesters, reported being confined in inaccessible places or having no 
money to pay for transportation to leave. The average traveling time from the harvest 
areas to the closest rural communities that had very basic services was 82 hours by a 
combination of different means of transportation (by foot, on motorcycle, and by boat).  
Generally, transport is paid for by the employer at the beginning and ending of the 
harvest, but workers who want to leave early must pay for their own transportation, 
which is very expensive. One respondent interviewed reported that he had fled his 
workplace. There have been reports of Brazil-nut workers being confined in very remote 
areas that take 15 days to reach by boat, which the researchers could not reach for 
security and logistical reasons. 
 
Psychological Compulsion, i.e. an Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat 
of a Penalty for Non-compliance 
 
Sixty-seven workers (25 percent) reported death threats against themselves or family 
members who said they wanted to leave. Forty-four workers (16 percent) reported 
threats of physical abuse, including sexual abuse against the worker or his/her partner 
or daughters. Many of the indebted workers reported that they were afraid that they 
would be asked to stay at the barraca until they finished paying off their debt or that if 
they failed to pay off their debt, their property could be confiscated. In addition, 107 
workers (39 percent) reported fear of expulsion from their community and 73 workers 
(44 percent) reported that they were afraid of not being hired for the following harvest.  
 
Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Extortionate Increase in 
Prices, Reduction in the Value of Goods Harvested or Services Rendered, or 
Excessive Interest Charged)  
 
Many self-employed indigenous and peasant Brazil-nut harvesters contact a Brazil-nut 
broker (rescatador) who acts indirectly as an employer because he provides harvesters 
with working capital in the form of food, supplies, and tools. These products, known as 
the "habilito," are provided throughout the three to four months of the harvest and the 
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price the rescatador sets is considerably higher than what the goods cost at the 
Riberalta market. The workers must repay their debt with Brazil-nuts, at prices set by 
the rescatador at the beginning of the harvest, even if this price is lower than what they 
would receive on the open market, which it usually is. Some individuals may pay the 
debt with cash generated from other sources or they may remain indebted until the next 
harvest.  
 
A habilito may also be given to an indigenous community or peasant sindicato 
(community collective, not a union), which then becomes indebted to the rescatador. 
The workers or community must repay their debt with the Brazil-nuts that they harvest.  
The price is set by the lender at the beginning of the harvest and is usually lower than 
what the harvesters would receive on the open market. There are also reports of fraud 
in the measurement of the quantity of Brazil-nuts harvested. If the value of Brazil-nuts 
collected by a community is not sufficient to pay the debt, the debt is carried over to the 
next harvest season.  
 
Salaried workers are also provided with a habilito by business owners, which they must 
pay back by harvesting Brazil-nuts. Business owners either own stores themselves, or 
have arrangements with purveyors in Riberalta to obtain the necessary food, tools, and 
supplies for Brazil-nut harvesters. The business owners involved in the harvest of 
Brazil-nuts include landowners, landowners who also own Brazil-nut processing plants, 
and barraca managers. Every worker is “an account holder‖ (“propietario de cuenta”). 
The barraca manager pays for the transportation and habilito of all “account holders‖ 
and adult assistants, who depend on the delivery of this habilito to survive in the 
isolated areas in which they work. The record of the products delivered to the account 
holder is kept by the manager and the prices he sets for the habilito can be changed 
throughout the harvest. The Brazil-nuts with which account holders must pay back their 
debt are measured using standardized wooden boxes called barricas, which in many 
cases are overfilled so workers are underpaid. 
 
If harvesters are unable to pay back their loans, they become indebted to the rescatador 
or the barraca or factory owner who hired them. To repay this debt, workers may be 
retained in the barraca doing maintenance work, transporting Brazil-nuts, or in other 
types of agriculture or forestry work. Earnings are withheld until the debt is paid, and 
workers often take on additional debt for food, supplies, and tools during this time. This 
can result in a cycle of debt, especially when the worker has his family living with him, 
and harvesters are often unable to repay their debt in full.  
 
Harvesters who are unable to pay off their debt by harvesting Brazil-nuts may pay off 
their debt in other ways. For example, the debt of harvesters who are indebted to a 
barraca owner may be “bought‖ by a factory owner who must pay them back with 
factory work. If workers are not able to repay their debts, they may risk losing the 
habilito for the next harvest, thus endangering their livelihoods. Workers who fail to pay 
back the loans may be blacklisted, have their property confiscated or may be subjected 
to physical or sexual violence, which often goes unpunished due to a lack of authorities 
in remote areas. In more severe cases, harvesters pay their debt with property, such as 
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a motorcycle. There have also been reports of creditors violently taking workers' 
property.  
 
Indebtedness can also be found in Brazil-nut processing factories. Quebradores/as 
(who break open the Brazil-nut shells) and sorters are generally women who work at the 
factories and receive a piece rate. Many of these workers are also account holders who 
must pay off their debt through their work. By becoming an account holder, these 
workers have access to a factory store, which is owned by the plant owner or by 
someone with whom the plant owner has an agreement. These workers can then 
receive products from the store on credit against their future earnings. They are only 
paid in cash once they have paid off their debt. In some cases, they can request an 
advance that is deducted from their income. These systems result in a cycle of debt and 
a reduction in workers' earnings due to inflated prices for the goods that they receive 
and the low prices that they receive for their Brazil-nuts. 
 
Of the 273 workers interviewed, 170 (62 percent) stated they had borrowed money 
through the habilito system or to pay fees to obtain their jobs. Fifteen workers (five 
percent) reported being charged interest for cash loans. In one case, a worker who 
borrowed money from a friend (who was not his employer) paid 30 percent annual 
interest. When the loan was for the habilito, there was no interest, with the lender's 
income coming from over-charging for the products provided to the workers and from 
the low price paid for the Brazil-nuts collected or processed. The collateral for loans 
includes the confiscation of workers' identity cards (carnets de identidad), a co-signer, 
and workers' property. Four percent of workers interviewed reported that they had to 
give their identity cards to their lender as collateral, which would only be returned when 
they paid back their loans. In addition, 148 workers (54 percent) reported having to 
hand over their identity cards to their lender, who made a copy and gave back the 
cards.  
 
Of the 74 salaried Brazil-nut harvesters surveyed, 72 (97 percent) reported that they 
had become indebted because at the start of the harvest they receive the habilito in the 
form of food, products, and tools that their employer provided to them, their families, 
and dependents. The cost of these supplies is considered to be a debt, which the 
workers must pay off with Brazil-nuts. The price that the employer will pay for the Brazil-
nuts is stipulated in the employment contract (written or verbal), or is assessed by the 
employer at the time of payment. Sixty-three (85 percent) of the salaried harvesters 
interviewed reported not receiving a written contract. Therefore, these workers had no 
written guarantee of the price they would be paid for the Brazil-nuts that they harvested. 
In many cases, harvesters did not keep a record of the amount of debt owed and 
lenders, who control the accounts, exercise final authority regarding the amounts owed 
and the prices to be paid for the Brazil-nuts.  
 
Of the 22 permanent factory workers interviewed, 18 (82 percent) reported that they 
were indebted. In the case of permanent factory workers, employers had an 
arrangement with or owned a store from which the worker purchased goods, with the 
cost of these items being deducted from their wages. Of the 70 temporary factory 
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workers surveyed, 54 (77 percent) reported that their employer had an arrangement 
with or owned a store from which the worker could get products to be charged to “their 
account.‖  
  
Of 273 workers surveyed, 154 (56 percent) reported being indebted at the end of the 
harvest or period of industrial processing of Brazil-nuts in the factories. In these cases, 
payments are deferred until the next harvest, covered by earnings from future earnings 
from their factory job, by earnings from other jobs, or through work in other activities for 
the same employer. 
 
Deception or False Promises about Types and Terms of Work  
 
Out of 273 workers interviewed, 82 workers (30 percent) reported that they were 
recruited by a labor broker. None of these workers reported signing a contract with the 
broker. Seventy-four workers (26 percent) reported that they signed a contract directly 
with the employer. Of the workers interviewed who reported that they signed 
employment contracts, 82 percent reported that information on their rights and 
obligations or working conditions was not included.  
 
All first year harvesters interviewed reported false promises about the amount of money 
that they would earn during the harvest season and all factory workers interviewed 
reported false promises of the amount that they would earn, due to unrealistic 
production quotas. Eighty-five percent of workers (232) reported deception in the 
weighing of Brazil-nuts harvested or peeled. All 273 harvesters reported a failure to 
inform workers about extra tasks that they would have to carry out, such as transporting 
Brazil-nuts or building payoles (huts).  
 
Withholding and Non-payment of Wages  
 
An account holder is the person who gets paid for the volume of Brazil-nuts 
harvested/peeled or processed and who takes out loans and advances. Almost all 
workers interviewed were either “account holders,‖ or were dependents of an account 
holder. All harvesters interviewed reported that their earnings were retained during the 
three or four month harvest and they received advances on their wages through the 
habilito. At the end of the harvest, the difference between the amount of money that 
they earned and the amount that was advanced to them is calculated. If their earnings 
are more than their advances, they are owed money. When harvesters are owed money 
at the end of the harvest season, their payments are often withheld until the Brazil-nuts 
have been sold, which can take from one to three months and sometimes even longer.   
 
In the case of factory workers, the amount of workers' debt, or the amount owed to 
workers is tallied on a monthly basis. Factory workers may have their payments 
withheld as a credit against which they can continue to receive goods from factory 
stores or they may be paid in cash at the end of the month. 
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Of the 273 respondents interviewed, 59 (22 percent), all of whom had kept accounts of 
their debt and money owed to them, reported being dissatisfied with the payment 
systems. However, they reported not complaining for fear of not being hired for the next 
harvest, or for fear of being fired from processing plants. The rest of the respondents did 
not know whether their accounting of their payments and debts was correct or not 
because they did not, or were unable to, keep track of their amount of debt and 
earnings.  
 
Retention of Identity Documents or Other Valuable Personal Effects  
 
Of the 273 workers interviewed, 148 (54 percent) reported providing their identity cards 
to money lenders, so that they could be copied and immediately returned to them. In 
addition, 11 workers (four percent) reported that their identity cards were obtained by 
money lenders as collateral for cash loans and were not returned until they paid back 
the debt. 
 
 
Menace of a Penalty (the Means of Keeping Someone in Forced Labor) - Actual 
Presence or Credible Threat: 
 
General  
 
Forty-seven (17 percent) of the 273 respondents did not feel free to leave their place of 
work. Of these workers, 20 (seven percent) were denied permission to leave and 27 
(ten percent) reported being unable to leave due to lack of transportation or money, as 
they were extremely isolated.  
 
Of the 273 workers interviewed, 204 (75 percent) reported that they could freely quit 
their jobs. However, 169 workers interviewed (62 percent) reported that they did not feel 
free to quit their jobs because they had debts that they were required to pay. In one 
case, a worker was forcibly detained with the use of violence and had to escape.  
 
Physical Violence against Workers, against Their Family or People Close to Them  
 
Sixty-seven workers (25 percent of all interviewed workers) reported the presence of 
armed guards at the processing plants, or that the barraca manager was armed. Sixty-
seven workers (25 percent) reported death threats against themselves or their family 
members. Forty-four workers (16 percent) reported threats of physical abuse, including 
sexual abuse against the worker or to his/her partner or daughters. Twenty-one workers 
(eight percent) reported being subjected to severe verbal abuse. Twenty-three workers 
(eight percent) reported being beaten or seeing another worker beaten in their 
presence.  
 
Twenty-two harvesters interviewed (30 percent) reported that the barraca manager was 
armed, and felt that he used his weapon as a means of coercion. Fourteen harvesters 
reported that a barraca manager had threatened to kill them with a weapon.   
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Sexual Violence  
 
Ten workers (four percent) reported that they were aware of workers who had been 
forced to have sex at work. This was most prevalent among female cooks who worked 
for the barraca managers. Female harvesters and factory workers are frequently 
subjected to sexual harassment and in some cases sexual abuse by their co-workers.  
 
(Threat of) Supernatural Retaliation  
 
The animistic religion followed by some inhabitants of the Amazonian region of Bolivia 
creates conditions conducive to the threat of supernatural retaliation. However, the 
researchers were unable to obtain data on the frequency of threats of supernatural 
retaliation. The most common threats of supernatural retaliation involve emotional 
blackmail in the context of the compadrazgo relationship, in which there is a veiled 
threat of supernatural punishment for not obeying a godfather or godmother who forces 
the godson or goddaughter to work. Another threat of supernatural retaliation involves 
the threat of death by being “swallowed‖ by the jungle and disappearing during the 
harvest. This fear is generated by fostering suspicions that missing workers were 
“swallowed‖ by the jungle for misbehaving or disobeying their bosses. 
 
Imprisonment or Other Physical Confinement  
 
Thirty-nine workers (14 percent) revealed that due to the extreme isolation in which they 
worked, they were "abandoned" in the jungle for over a month and in some cases 
throughout the harvest, without any means of transport available for them to leave.  
 
Financial Penalties  
 
No financial penalties were reported.  
 
Dismissal from Work 
 
Of the 92 factory workers interviewed, eleven workers (four percent) reported being 
threatened with dismissal as a means of coercion.  
 
Exclusion from Future Employment  
 
Fifty workers (18 percent) reported the use of blacklists as a means of punishment. Of 
all the 166 salaried workers interviewed, 73 (44 percent) reported that exclusion from 
hiring for the following harvest or factory production season was used as a means of 
coercion.  
 
Exclusion from Community and Social Life  
 
Of the 273 workers interviewed, 107 (39 percent) reported that expulsion from their 
community was used as a threat. Although workers reported that they feared expulsion 
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from the community for failure to harvest enough Brazil-nuts, the researchers found no 
cases in which community members were expelled from their communities solely for 
failing to harvest enough Brazil-nuts. The researchers did interview two workers who 
had been expelled from their communities, but their offenses included a failure to 
harvest enough Brazil-nuts, as well as other offenses such as carrying out crimes. This 
issue is present mostly among peasants and indigenous groups, for whom survival 
depends on the inclusion and support of their communities, but was also reported 
among peasant workers who were members of “sindicatos” (community collectives that 
harvest Brazil-nuts, “not unions‖).  
 
Expulsion from a community means the loss of workers' homes, social networks, 
livelihoods and land. Indigenous leaders establish a series of rules and obligations for 
members of the community. These are unwritten rules because the indigenous 
languages are not written languages, but the rules are clearly communicated to all 
members of the community. Among the obligations is that community members engage 
in productive activities, including harvesting Brazil-nuts. The failure to meet these 
obligations can result in punishments, the most serious of which is expulsion from the 
community. Indigenous leaders sometimes make agreements with businesses to deliver 
a certain amount of Brazil-nuts in exchange for a certain amount of habilito or an 
amount of money to be paid upon delivery of the Brazil-nuts. This habilito or money is 
distributed among community members according to the needs of each family. As 
indigenous communities are able to sustain themselves in the jungle, they do not 
depend on the habilito as much as peasant settlers, although this is changing due to an 
increased demand for consumer goods. In many cases, each head of household is 
assigned a certain amount of Brazil-nuts that they must harvest.  
 
Peasants harvest Brazil-nuts on their own parcels of land. Rescatadores give the 
habilito to individuals, but there are also sindicatos (community collectives) of peasant 
workers who take out a collective contract to deliver a certain amount of Brazil-nuts for a 
habilito, which is distributed among community members. In this case, each head of 
household is assigned a certain amount of Brazil-nuts to harvest and sindicato 
members reported that they could be expelled from the sindicato if they failed to do so. 
If peasant workers are expelled from the sindicato they lose their right to their land. If a 
worker gives their Brazil-nuts to an individual buyer instead of the sindicato they can be 
forced to buy this quantity of Brazil-nuts and provide it to the sindicato or they can be 
forced to do community service (construction of schools or docks, cleaning of paths, or 
to be an “attendant‖ during community fiestas-which is the lowest position in the social 
hierarchy).  
 
Removal of Rights or Privileges  
 
Workers reported that their land rights could be lost due to a failure to harvest a certain 
amount of Brazil-nuts (see Exclusion from community and social life above). 
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Deprivation of Food, Shelter or Other Necessities  
 
As harvesters were extremely isolated and depended on their rescatadores and 
employers to provide them with food and supplies through the habilito, there was 
inherently a menace of penalty of deprivation of food and supplies. In addition, workers 
who failed to pay back their loans or who complained were not provided with the habilito 
the next year and there were many reports of formal and informal blacklists of these 
workers that were circulated amongst rescatadores and employers. For many workers, 
the habilito comprises a key source of food that allows them to survive during the 
harvest season, and although it is a repressive system, the threat of deprivation of the 
habilito constitutes a menace of penalty. 
 
Shift to Even Worse Working Conditions 
 
Seventy workers (26 percent) reported that they had to keep working to pay their debt 
after the harvest season ended by maintaining the barraca facilities or working as 
Brazil-nut transporters. These workers reported experiencing worse working conditions 
and that they were paid a daily wage that was much less than what they made per day 
during the harvest season. Additionally, they continued to receive food, tools, and 
supplies in the form of a habilito so their debt continued to increase. The most frequent 
activities included cleaning the barracas; repairing the “  payoles‖ (huts), rebuilding 
docks, clearing the paths that lead into the jungle for Brazil-nut harvesting, and 
repairing, building, or clearing the roads for tractors, trucks, and motorcycles. 
 
Loss of Social Status  
 
Workers reported that they could be forced to carry out community service, including 
socially demeaning work as “attendants‖ at community fiestas if they failed to provide 
their sindicatos (community collectives) with a certain amount of Brazil-nuts (see 
Exclusion from community and social life above). 
 
 
Wages and Hours 
 
Wages 
 
Of the 273 workers interviewed, 137 workers (50 percent) reported receiving in kind 
payments of food, tools, and supplies instead of cash. Self-employed harvesters earned 
an average of BOB 2,416 (USD 350) per month during the harvest; factory workers 
earned an average of BOB 653 (USD 96) per month; and salaried harvesters earned an 
average of BOB 500 (USD 74) per month. Although self-employed harvesters earned a 
higher amount than other workers, they had no work in many cases for four to nine 
months of the year (during the down season). Of the 273 workers interviewed, 195 (71 
percent) earned less than the national minimum wage.  
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Working Hours 
 
The Brazil-nut harvest in the Amazon jungle is comprised of three months of intensive 
tasks and another month for the harvest of leftover Brazil-nuts. This means the 
workload is concentrated in three to four months, leaving between eight and nine 
months of unemployment. During the harvest, work takes place from sun-up to sun-
down (6:00 am to 7:00 pm) and the extraction of the Brazil-nut seed by splitting the 
pods can last until 9:00 or 10:00 pm. This represents up to 16 hours of work per day, 
with an average of ten hours per day.   
 
Brazil-nut processing consists of washing, boiling, shelling or peeling, and packing 
Brazil-nuts for export. Processing is a year-long process, with six months of intensive 
work, three months of moderate work, and a remaining three months of reduced work. 
Brazil-nut industrial processing plants typically remain active from 4:00 am to 10:00 pm, 
for 18 hours of continuous activity. During these 18 hours, female workers rotate in 
shifts doing piecework. Consequently, the amount of time that they stay in the plant can 
vary significantly. During the high season, they can work up to 15 hours per day, with a 
short half-hour meal break. During the low season, work does not exceed four to five 
hours per day. Throughout the year, processing plant workers average about ten hours 
of work per day. During periods of intensive work, there is no weekly day of rest for 
harvesters or processing plant workers. 
 
 
Brazil-Nuts-Other Issues of Concern 
 
 
 Benefits 
 
None of the harvesters interviewed received any of the benefits to which they were 
legally entitled. Of the 92 factory workers interviewed, 83 (90 percent) reported that they 
received a Christmas bonus (Aguinaldo); 40 (43 percent) received health insurance; 13 
(14 percent) received maternity leave and a breast feeding bonus;  
47 (51 percent) received vacation time; and 23 (25 percent) received pay for overtime 
worked, but that they did not receive an overtime premium. 
 
 
Health and Safety  
 
Workers face serious hazards to their health and safety in Brazil-nut harvesting, ranging 
from the existence of serious endemic consumptive diseases such as malaria and 
tuberculosis, to work-related accidents such as Brazil-nut pods falling from the trees 
onto workers, poisonous animal bites, machete injuries, motorcycle and outboard motor 
canoe accidents while transporting Brazil-nuts, and injuries from carrying heavy bags of 
Brazil-nuts. 
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In the processing plants, the greatest health and safety threat facing workers was heat 
exhaustion and dehydration due to the high temperatures in the factories. Moreover, 
workers reported a lack of medical services for a large majority of workers.  
 
Fifty-six (21 percent) of the 273 workers interviewed reported having been hurt or sick 
during the work season. Thirty-nine workers (14 percent) received some form of medical 
care and 23 workers (59 percent of these workers) reported paying for their medical 
care. 
 
 
Discrimination  
 
Fifty-six workers (20 percent of all workers interviewed) reported discrimination, 
including the use of blacklists to discriminate against workers who were fired for 
complaining about payment calculations, demanding better working conditions, or for 
participating in union leadership posts, among other causes.  
 
Gender-based discrimination was also reported, as only male harvesters are considered 
account holders. Only eight female account holders were found by researchers, all of 
whom had inherited the accounts and debts of male relatives or partners who had died 
or had abandoned them. In factories, it was reported that men were generally not 
contracted as quebradoras due to perceptions that women worked harder due to family 
obligations. 
 
 
Living Conditions 
 
Harvesters build their own dwellings. These workers generally live in huts made out of 
stick walls, with palm frond roofs and dirt floors. The huts have no electricity or running 
water. Factory workers generally build their own barriadas, which have palm frond or 
corrugated sheet metal roofs.  
 
Food during the harvest is provided through the habilito system, by which employer 
representatives deliver uncooked staples to workers, to be paid with the Brazil-nuts 
collected. The pricing of these products is highly variable. Factory workers are not 
provided with food by employers; however, there are private suppliers that operate 
around, and in some cases inside, the plants, which provide food for cash or deferred 
payment through an arrangement between the private supplier and the factory owner.  
 
 
Transportation 
 
Brazil-nut harvesters are transported by trucks, carts pulled by tractors, motorcycles, 
canoes, and boats. The average travel time from workers' communities to the barracas 
was 82 hours. Twenty-nine (11 percent) of workers reported that transport by 
motorcycle is dangerous.  
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Child Labor  
 
As Brazil-nut harvesting is carried out by entire families, child labor is extremely 
common. Ninety-one (33 percent) of respondents used one or more family members as 
helpers, including 14 children under six years of age, 75 minors between seven and14 
years of age, and 44 child workers between the ages of 15 and 18. Generally, boys 
above the age of 12 go with their fathers to harvest Brazil-nuts in the jungle, while girls 
over 12 help their mothers open the pods. Harvesting can be hazardous, as children 
carry bags of Brazil-nuts weighing up to 40 kilograms (and more when they are wet from 
rain), heavy Brazil-nut pods can fall on children's heads, they can be bitten by 
poisonous snakes and spiders, and may get lost in the jungle. There are also risks for 
girls involved with cutting open Brazil-nut pods with a machete. Both boys and girls work 
in high temperatures of up to 104 degrees Fahrenheit for 12 to 14 hours per day, 
sometimes under torrential rain. While children under 12 are generally not given 
machetes and are not brought under the Brazil-nut trees to harvest nuts, they may help 
with light work. Tasks do not vary greatly depending on age among children above the 
age of 12, but the quantity of work does vary according to age.  
 
Despite restrictions recently introduced by some processing plants, researchers found 
that children also worked in Brazil-nut processing factories. Research uncovered 
evidence that factories sometimes hired children to work at night in order to avoid child 
labor inspections and sanctions. Although rare, there was a risk of these children losing 
their fingers in machines that break open the Brazil-nuts.    
 
 
Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Demographic Characteristics 
 
In this study of the working conditions and indicators of forced labor in the production of 
cattle, corn, and peanuts in the Bolivian Chaco, more than 750 responses yielded 601 
valid surveys, including 537 valid surveys for corn production, 278 for peanut 
production, and 233 for cattle production. Given that a single worker can work in the 
production of two or more products, a single survey could provide information for more 
than one product. For a chart of demographic characteristics and research findings 
broken down by product, see Appendix 9: Chart of Findings by Product. 
 
 
Gender 
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed whose surveys were judged to be valid, 253 (42 
percent) were female and 348 (58 percent) were males. Most of the workers who 
granted interviews were heads of household who answered questions about their wives 
or partners who also worked on the family plot or the hacienda.  
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Age 
 
The average age of male and female workers was 43. The respondents included 15 
workers under the age of 18 (two percent of workers interviewed), one of whom was 
younger than eight  years-old, three who were 13 years-old, three who were 15 years-
old, three who were 16 years-old, one was 17 years-old, and four who did not specify 
their ages but were clearly under 18.  
 
 
Marital Status  
 
Of the 601 workers surveyed, 396 (66 percent) reported being married or in a stable 
relationship and 103 workers (17 percent) did not provide information about whether 
they were married or in a stable relationship.  
 
 
Children 
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, 225 (37 percent) reported that they had children; 103 
workers (17 percent) did not provide information about whether they had children.  On 
average, both male and female workers had three children.  
 
 
Education 
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, 132 (22 percent) reported that they had no education; 
343 (57 percent) had attained a fifth grade education; 49 (eight percent) had completed 
some level of secondary education; 36 (six percent) had graduated from secondary 
school; and nine (one percent) had attained some degree of higher education.  
 
 
Language and Ethnicity 
 
Of the 537 corn producers interviewed, 450 (84 percent) spoke Spanish. Of the 537 
corn producers, 452 (84 percent) spoke Guaraní as their first language, of whom 376 
(70 percent) spoke Guaraní and Spanish and 76 (14 percent) only spoke Guaraní. In 
addition, eight of the 537 corn producers (two percent) spoke Weenhayek as their first 
language and 32 (six percent) spoke Quechua as their first language. Of the 537 corn 
producers interviewed, 452 (84 percent) identified themselves as Guaraní, eight as 
Weenhayek (two percent), 32 (six percent) as Quechua, and 45 (eight percent) as 
mestizos. The ethnic and linguistic breakdowns were similar for cattle and peanuts. 
 
 
 
 
 
  P a g e  | 53 
Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Privacy and Credibility 
 
Of 601 worker interviews, 420 (70 percent) took place in private and 177 (29 percent) in 
the presence of others, usually family members. The credibility of the informants was 
judged as being high.  
 
 
Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Presence of Indicators of Forced Labor 
 
 
Lack of Consent to (Involuntary Nature of) Work (the “Route into” Forced Labor) 
 
Birth/Descent into “Slave” or Bonded Status 
 
Research indicates that in the past it was common for generations of workers to be born 
into bondage. During research activities, there were reports of this occurring on only two 
haciendas, one in Huacareta and another in Alto Parapetí. Researchers attempted to 
talk to workers at these haciendas, but these workers were not allowed to talk to 
outsiders.  
 
Physical Confinement in the Work Location  
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, 26 (four percent) stated they were not allowed to leave 
their workplace. Key informants interviewed at the end of research activities reported 
that there were groups of workers who were forcibly taken and confined in haciendas in 
other regions, such as northern Santa Cruz and Beni, but because those areas were not 
included in the original scope of the study and the time scheduled for research activities 
ran out, Verité could not corroborate these allegations.  
 
Hacienda workers and self-employed workers lack access to public transport. While 
isolation of haciendas was an issue of concern in the past, it is less of an issue now, but 
the isolation of self-employed indigenous producers is still very severe. In some cases, 
trucks arrive in isolated indigenous communities only at the time of harvest or to bring in 
seeds and supplies. Twelve workers interviewed reported access to transportation once 
a month in their communities; five reported that transportation came “once in a while;‖ 
and four reported that no vehicles ever entered their community because there was not 
a road to their communities. Other workers interviewed had more regular access to 
transportation. 
 
Psychological Compulsion, i.e. an Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat 
of a Penalty for Non-compliance 
 
Twenty-three percent of workers interviewed (139) reported that they were indebted to 
their employers, many of whom reported that they were concerned that they would be 
asked to stay at the farm until they paid off the debt and would not be able to go back to 
their land or work somewhere else.  
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Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Extortionate Increase in 
Prices, Reduction in the Value of Goods Harvested or Services Rendered, or 
Excessive Interest Charged)  
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, 139 (23 percent) reported having been indebted to their 
employers at some time, with higher rates of indebtedness among salaried workers. 
Fifty-five of the 140 salaried corn workers interviewed (39 percent) reported that they 
were indebted; 40 of the 102 salaried peanut workers (39 percent) reported that they 
were indebted; and 39 of the 100 salaried cattle workers interviewed (39 percent) 
reported that they had to borrow money. This was about double the rate of 
indebtedness compared to self-employed workers (20 percent for self-employed cattle 
and corn producers and 18 percent for self-employed peanut producers).  
 
Employers provided salaried workers with advances of money and supplies, resulting in 
indebtedness. Among hacienda employees, the average debt was estimated at BOB 
300 (USD 45). Fifty-five workers interviewed (ten percent of the 601 workers 
interviewed) reported that they were paid some or all of their wages in food. Workers 
reported that employers inflated the prices of goods that they provided to workers, 
especially food, as many workers were unaware of market prices. Also, due to workers' 
low educational levels, they depended on employers for payment and debt calculations. 
Twenty-six workers (five percent of the 601 workers interviewed) reported that they 
were under a permanent obligation to work for their employer because they were never 
able to earn enough to pay off their debt. Salaried workers reported that some or all of 
their wages were withheld and that they could not leave their employer without paying 
back their debt, which affected both workers and their families.  
 
Of the 79 self-employed cattle, corn, and peanut workers interviewed, 12 (15 percent) 
reported that they had become indebted during the previous year. Some self-employed 
workers did not have the seeds, fertilizer, or tools that they needed to carry out their 
work. Therefore, rescatadores and hacienda owners provided them with these products 
at inflated prices. The producers had to pay back these in-kind loans with meat, milk, 
cheese, corn, or peanuts, the value of which was set by the lenders below market price. 
While interest was not charged, the lenders made money from the loans through their 
leverage in setting prices. In some cases, the producers had to pay back loans with 
work, and in other cases when they were not able to pay the debt, they were threatened 
with physical harm or the lenders confiscated pigs, chickens, or cattle. Indebted self-
employed workers borrowed an average of BOB 6,000 (USD 882) in products per year. 
Self-employed workers who failed to pay back their loans were unable to take out 
additional loans, which negatively affected their families. 
 
Deception or False Promises about Types and Terms of Work 
  
Thirty six salaried workers (46 percent of the 79 salaried workers interviewed) reported 
that they felt deceived because promises made at the time of hiring were not fulfilled. 
This deception involved promises about the provision of food or coca leaves as part of 
the payment and the time required to perform the tasks that workers were contracted to 
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carry out. Workers also reported that payments were withheld until the tasks were 
completed and that they were not allowed to use assigned pieces of land to grow 
subsistence crops.  
 
By Decree, servitude was abolished and landowners are required to pay workers the 
wages that they should have been paid while they were in servitude as well as an 
indemnity (see Appendix 2: Legal Framework). In some cases, employers promised to 
pay workers in land rather than in cash, as the amount owed can be very large. There 
were cases in which workers reported that they stayed on the haciendas and continued 
working due to false promises that they would be paid in cash or land. Of the 61 
haciendas visited for in-depth research, 45 were found to still have salaried workers 
living on them. 
 
Withholding and Non-payment of Wages  
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, five workers (less than one percent) reported being 
charged for the use of their homes on the haciendas. In these cases, the workers were 
not paid in cash, but instead were provided with housing and food.  
 
Workers who were indebted to their employer had either all or part of their wages 
withheld as payment for their debts until they had paid off their debts. Workers paid by 
the task had all of their payment withheld until the completion of the task, or were paid 
an advance at the beginning of the task and the balance upon completion. 
 
As mentioned in the Deception or false promises about types and terms of work section 
above, many workers were owed money for past uncompensated work which went 
unpaid. 
  
Retention of Identity Documents / Valuable Personal Effects  
 
There were no reported cases of retention of identity documents or other valuable 
personal effects.  
 
 
Menace of Penalty (the Means of Keeping Someone in Forced Labor) - Actual 
Presence or Credible Threat: 
 
General  
 
Twenty-six workers (four percent of the 601 workers interviewed) did not feel free to 
leave their workplace. None of the indebted workers interviewed reported that they 
could leave their place of work without having paid their debt.  
 
Physical Violence against Workers, against Their Family or People Close to Them 
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, 33 (six percent) reported that they were threatened, 
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insulted, or physically attacked. Twelve workers interviewed (two percent of the 601 
workers interviewed) reported that they were fearful of being physically harmed in the 
workplace; 21 (four percent) reported being threatened with physical violence; and four 
workers (less than one percent) reported that their bosses had been physically 
aggressive with them. 
 
Sexual Violence  
 
Four case studies revealed sexual harassment and abuse on the haciendas. These 
cases involved girls and young women who were hired as domestic servants in the 
houses of patrons or supervisors, who sexually abused them. However, there were 
indications that as captive workers were increasingly being liberated, this type of sexual 
violence was becoming less and less common.  
 
(Threat of) Supernatural Retaliation  
 
There were no reported cases of threats of supernatural retaliation. 
 
Imprisonment or Other Physical Confinement  
 
Physical confinement was a common practice on the haciendas. The researchers 
received reports of cases of severe physical isolation and confinement on two 
haciendas, but access to these haciendas was denied so the researchers were not able 
to verify these reports. However, workers interviewed did not report that imprisonment 
of physical confinement was used as a threat or penalty. 
 
Financial Penalties  
 
Researchers did not detect the use of financial penalties as a threat or means of 
punishment.  
 
Dismissal from Work 
 
Researchers did not detect the use of dismissal from work as a threat or means of 
punishment.  
 
Exclusion from Future Employment  
 
Researchers did not detect the use of exclusion from future employment as a threat or 
means of punishment.  
 
Exclusion from Community and Social Life  
 
Among the 83 indigenous self-employed workers interviewed, 100 percent reported that 
work was compulsory in their communities. According to the rules of indigenous 
communities, a person who does not work may be penalized, including with expulsion 
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from the community. Although these rules are not written because indigenous 
languages are not written languages, the rules are clearly communicated to all 
members of the community. Each year, indigenous workers are assigned a certain 
amount of land on which to plant corn and peanuts and/or are assigned a certain 
amount of time to work with cattle. They share the corn, peanuts, milk, cheese, and 
meat that are produced. Workers who fail to carry out this work may face the threat of 
expulsion from the community, which can mean the loss of their home, lands, jobs, and 
social networks.  
 
Removal of Rights or Privileges  
 
No cases or threats of removal of rights or privileges were reported. 
 
Deprivation of Food, Shelter or Other Necessities  
 
Workers interviewed did not report cases or threats of deprivation of food, shelter, or 
other necessities.  
 
Shift to Even Worse Working Conditions  
 
No cases or threats of shifts to even worse working conditions were reported. 
 
Loss of Social Status  
 
Among peasant self-employed workers who worked on communal lands, it was reported 
that those who did not work in corn, cattle, and peanut production could be assigned 
menial or demeaning tasks, such as being “attendants‖ during community fiestas, which 
denotes the lowest level of the social hierarchy. 
 
 
Wages and Hours 
 
Wages 
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, 595 (99 percent) earned less than the national 
minimum wage set for 2010 at BOB 679 (USD 99) per month. The severe degree of 
poverty observed among indigenous workers and peasants interviewed makes it 
evident that the payment they received for their work was much less than what was 
needed to cover their basic needs.  
 
Seventy-three workers (12 percent of the 601 workers interviewed) received food as 
part of their salary. Workers who were provided with food were paid BOB 40 (USD 6) 
per day, while daily wages without food were BOB 50 (USD 7.30) to BOB 60 (USD 9) 
for eight to ten hour workdays.   
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Working Hours 
 
Among workers interviewed, working hours averaged approximately 12 hours per day, 
six days a week. Animal husbandry demands daily work without rest.  
 
 
Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts-Other Issues of Concern 
 
 
Health and Safety  
 
Health and safety conditions in the Chaco region were extremely poor, including the 
presence of endemic diseases such as severe consumptive malaria, tuberculosis, and 
Chagas disease. In the desert, bites from poisonous animals like snakes and scorpions 
were relatively frequent. However, most injuries came from workers being trapped in 
fires caused by the practice of slash and burn agriculture called chaqueo, which is used 
to clear and prepare agricultural land. Prolonged periods of drought make the brush 
extremely combustible. Chaqueo is carried out just before the first rains when the fire 
risk is at its highest. Social security and health insurance were not provided by 
employers.  
 
Sixty-eight workers (11 percent of the 601 workers interviewed) reported that they or 
one of their coworkers had become ill or were injured on the job. Of these workers, 31 
requested medical care, for which they paid an average of BOB 50 (USD 7).  
 
 
Discrimination  
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, three workers (less than one percent) reported 
discrimination in hiring due to complaints about wages and differences in compensation.  
 
 
Living Conditions 
 
Of the 601 workers interviewed, five workers (less than one percent) reported being 
charged for the use of their homes on the haciendas. Seventy-three workers (12 
percent of the 601 workers interviewed) received food as part of their salary.  
 
 
Transportation 
 
Most workers lived at their workplaces, so dangerous or cramped transportation was not 
an issue of concern. 
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Child Labor  
 
Work in cattle, corn, and peanuts was generally carried out by the family unit, so child 
labor was extremely common. Of the 601 workers interviewed, 418 (67 percent) 
reported that they worked alongside their children and/or other family members under 
18 years of age. Children as young as five helped in planting, tilling, harvesting, milking 
cows and making cheese. Fifteen (three percent) of the 601 workers interviewed were 
under the age of 18. Workers interviewed reported that minors (including their own 
children) helped them carry out their work, including 14 children under the age of five, 
22 children between six and eight years of age, 112 children between the ages of nine 
and 13, and 129 children between 14 and 17 years of age. 
 
 
Conclusions  
 
This report has covered background information on Bolivia and the Brazil-nut, cattle, 
corn, and peanut sectors in the Amazon and Chaco regions. The report also explains 
the methodology that was developed to study the presence of indicators of forced labor 
in these sectors, findings on the presence of indicators of forced labor and other labor 
violations, and the factors that increase workers' vulnerability to labor exploitation. 
These findings are not statistically representative of Bolivia or the Brazil-nut, cattle, 
corn, or peanut sectors and this report does not claim to determine the existence or 
scale of forced labor in Bolivia. However, the report does provide an overview of the 
indicators of forced labor and other forms of labor exploitation uncovered amongst 
Brazil-nut workers in the Amazon region of Bolivia and cattle, corn, and peanut workers 
in the Chaco region of Bolivia, as well as factors that increase workers' vulnerability to 
labor exploitation. 
 
 
Main Findings 
 
Using ILO guidance on “Identifying forced labor in practice,‖ research detected evidence 
of the presence of the following indicators of lack of consent and menace of penalty, as 
well as other issues of concern. 
 
Brazil-nuts in the Amazon Region 
 
Lack of consent:  
 physical confinement in the work location,  
 psychological compulsion,  
 induced indebtedness,  
 deception or false promises about terms of work,  
 withholding and non-payment of wages, and  
 retention of identity documents. 
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Menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of):  
 physical violence against workers,  
 sexual violence,  
 supernatural retaliation,  
 physical confinement,  
 dismissal from work,  
 exclusion from future employment,  
 exclusion from community and social life, 
 removal of rights and privileges,  
 deprivation of food, 
 shift to even worse working conditions, and  
 loss of social status. 
 
Wages and hours: 
 low wages,  
 excessive working hours, and 
 a lack of days off during peak periods. 
 
Other issues of concern:  
 serious hazards to workers' health and safety,  
 discrimination,  
 poor living conditions,  
 dangerous transportation, and  
 child labor. 
 
Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts in the Chaco Region 
 
Lack of consent:  
 physical confinement in the work location,  
 psychological compulsion,  
 induced indebtedness,  
 deception or false promises about terms of work, and  
 withholding and non-payment of wages. 
 
Menace of penalty (the actual presence or threat of):  
 physical violence against workers,  
 sexual violence, and  
 loss of social status. 
 
Other issues of concern:  
 excessive working hours,  
 a lack of days off for workers in animal husbandry,  
 subminimum wages,  
 serious hazards to workers' health and safety, and  
 child labor. 
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Risk Factors 
 
Risk factors were detected amongst Brazil-nut harvesters and factory workers in the 
Amazon region, including: 
 harvesters reported high levels of extreme physical isolation, dependence on 
employers and rescatadores for food and transportation, and physical 
intimidation and threats; 
 salaried harvesters reported a high level of indebtedness and a lack of written 
contracts; and  
 factory workers (both permanent and temporary) reported high levels of 
indebtedness. 
 
Risk factors were detected amongst salaried workers and indigenous and peasant self-
employed workers in the cattle, corn, and peanut sectors in the Chaco region, including:  
 salaried workers reported a high rate of indebtedness and deception about terms 
of work; 
 indigenous self-employed workers reported compulsory work and expulsion from 
their communities for failing to carry out this work; and 
 peasant self-employed workers reported that they could be assigned demeaning 
tasks for failing to carry out compulsory work. 
 
 
Lessons Learned 
 
Verité was presented with a series of challenges while carrying out research in Bolivia, 
which offered valuable lessons on ways to successfully carry out research in areas in 
which it is. Researchers faced unique challenges related to conducting research in 
Bolivia, including flooding, road blocks, a serious car accident, and a violent assault of 
the Research Coordinator. This research also exposed some of the challenges of 
conducting research on hidden populations and vulnerable workers. These challenges 
included the inability to randomly sample respondents due to the lack of a list of 
workers. In addition, factors that made workers more vulnerable to exploitation, such as 
fear and low levels of education, also made it difficult to obtain information from them. 
To overcome these challenges, researchers adopted a flexible research plan and used 
multiple sources of both quantitative and qualitative information to triangulate findings.  
 
From these challenges, Verité learned that carrying out research in unstable countries 
with poor infrastructure creates unique challenges and that to overcome these 
challenges; a flexible research methodology, budget, and timeline must be used. Verité 
also learned that carrying out research in countries with large indigenous populations 
necessitates the use of indigenous researchers and contacts, both to understand the 
cultural context and to bridge the cultural gap and build confidence between non-
indigenous researchers and the indigenous population.  
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Appendix 1: Land Redistribution in Bolivia 
 
 
Laws on Land Redistribution 
 
Supreme Decree 29802 of November 19, 2008 established the definition of servitude, 
forced labor, debt peonage, slavery, families in captivity, and practices analogous to 
slavery in the agricultural sector. It also empowers the National Agrarian Reform 
Institute (INRA) to verify and determine the existence of forced labor. Servitude, forced 
labor, debt peonage, and/or enslavement of captive families is found to exist when 
communities, families, or individuals provide work or service on agricultural lands in 
violation of their fundamental rights, without their full consent, or when they are paid in 
kind or below the minimum wage. Supreme Decree 29802 also establishes that no 
debts accrued as a result of servitude, forced labor, peonage, slavery or captivity will be 
recognized.88  
 
The State recognizes communal or collective ownership of land; protects and 
guarantees the communal or collective property of peasant and indigenous 
communities; establishes that the people who work the land have the right to own it; 
establishes that lands must meet a social or economic function; and that state lands will 
be granted to peasants, indigenous, and Afro-Bolivian communities that do not own 
enough land in order to meet their needs.89 The Autonomy and Decentralization Law 
(Ley Marco de Autonomías y Descentralización) provided indigenous groups with land 
rights and the rights to autonomy and self-governance, including the regulation of 
working conditions in their areas of jurisdiction. In order to obtain land through 
government redistribution programs, Bolivians need to belong to an indigenous 
community to receive tierras originarias (ancestral lands) or to a group of peasant 
settlers to receive tierras fiscales (State lands). Expulsion from a community can thus 
mean the loss of workers' land rights.  
 
With reference to the saneamiento (confiscation and redistribution) of agricultural 
property, the Constitution establishes that those who work the land have the right to 
ownership. Property owners must ensure that their lands contribute to social or 
economic development, including through the sustainable use of land by indigenous 
peoples and peasant indigenous communities, as well as the use of small properties as 
the source of the livelihood, welfare, and cultural development of its owners.90 The 
regulation of land ownership is also governed by Law No. 1715 on the National Land 
Reform Service (Servicio Nacional de la Reforma Agraria) of October 18, 1996, which 
was amended by Law No. 3545 on Communitarian Renewal of Agrarian Reform 
(Reconducción Comunitaria de la Reforma Agraria) on November 28, 2006, which 
states that land must be used to serve a socio-economic function. Under the law, the 
process of saneamiento determines whether a property meets a Social Economic 
Function (Función Económica Social – FES); if it does not, INRA has the power to 
redistribute idle lands. Article 157 of Supreme Decree No. 29215 of August 2, 2007 
states that forced labor is contrary to the common good and the land on which forced 
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laborers work fails to serve a socio-economic function. The Decree includes penalties, 
including jail sentences and land confiscation for subjecting workers to forced labor.  
 
 
Conflicts over Land Redistribution 
 
Amazon Region 
 
In the Amazon region, land redistribution has resulted in a high degree of conflict 
between workers, local and national authorities, and land owners. In 2008, indigenous 
peoples, peasants, and representatives of the Pando Departmental Prefecture were 
murdered in what is known as the Massacre of Porvenir and Filadelfia.91 Labor 
relationships and working conditions have changed as a result. To be able to 
reconstruct these events, researchers gathered testimonies from witnesses, as well as 
trustworthy publicly available information.  
 
In 2006, the new Constitution established the right to autonomous indigenous 
ownership of their ancestral lands. In order to comply with the Constitution, the National 
Government mandated the reorganization of lands under the National Institute for 
Agrarian Reform (INRA), which had been in charge of rural lands in Bolivia since 1953. 
CIDOB demanded compliance with the new Constitution and requested ownership of 
indigenous peoples' ancestral lands. In order to distribute these lands in Pando 
Department, INRA established a technical team in their offices in the Departmental 
capital, Cobija, on the northern border with Brazil.  
 
Meanwhile, an opposition group formed in 2007, made up of a coalition called Media 
Luna (Half Moon) from five departments in Eastern Bolivia that form the lowlands 
opposition to the central government. Landowners and businessmen comprised this 
main opposition group that was resolutely against land redistribution. The group's leader 
in Pando was the Departmental Prefect, who was elected through a democratic vote 
and was the highest-ranking Departmental authority at the time.  
 
There are two contradictory rumors about how the conflict began, neither of which has 
been confirmed. A rumor circulating among indigenous peoples and peasants is that the 
Prefect was going to seize the INRA offices in Cobija and expel their technicians in 
order to stop the land redistribution. Being aware of this, peasants and indigenous 
groups gathered in Riberalta to march to Cobija to protect the INRA offices from the 
Prefect. Another rumor circulating in the Departmental Prefecture in Cobija is that 
indigenous groups and peasants met in Riberalta and decided to march to Cobija to 
overthrow the Prefect and seize the Prefecture, so prefecture employees were sent to 
bring heavy machinery, including dump trucks and tractors, to “defend their jobs‖ and to 
“stop‖ the marchers.  
 
It is clear that the marchers left from Riberalta, prefecture employees left from Cobija, 
and they met each other at Filadelfia and Porvenir. Both the marchers and prefecture 
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representatives reported that political activists, gunmen hired by landowners to stop the 
marchers, and members of the opposition infiltrated the lines of the Prefecture.   
 
When both groups confronted each other between September 11 and 19, 2008, 
gunmen opened fire against the indigenous leaders.92 Some of the indigenous marchers 
were carrying hunting weapons and responded by shooting their guns. People fled into 
the jungle, where both marchers and prefecture officers were shot and killed by 
gunmen. The dead and wounded were thrown into the river. The United Nations has 
declared that the events that took place in Porvenir on September 11, 2008 were a 
massacre, in which 11 people were killed and 50 were injured, rather than an armed 
confrontation between the marchers and authorities. The UN placed responsibility for 
the massacre on the Prefecture and members of the Pando Civic Committee (Comité 
Cívico Pandino).93 
 
When informed of the massacre, a police force from Cobija was sent to stop it, but 
indigenous marchers fled due to mistrust of the authorities and did not cooperate with 
the police. The national government ordered the Prefect's capture and imprisonment 
and he was taken to the capital city of La Paz to prevent his followers from attempting to 
free him from the local jail. In 2012, he was still in prison and was being tried. The 
President replaced the Prefect with an authority linked to the national government. The 
INRA's office was not dismantled and is still working on land redistribution.94  
 
Chaco Region 
 
In February 2008, INRA ordered the redistribution of land in the provinces Luis Calvo, 
Chuquisaca, and Cordillera, Santa Cruz. INRA technical brigades visited the area to 
measure the lands to be redistributed. In response, landlords organized “paramilitary 
task forces‖ to stop the INRA brigades, and in February 2008, the Cattle Ranchers' 
Federation (Federación de Ganaderos) drove INRA officers out of Camiri, and the Vice 
Minister of Labor was attacked and threatened with death on the Larsen hacienda, 
property of an American landlord with over 50,000 hectares of land.95 
 
In March 2008, landlords organized and blocked the roads to prevent visits from 
national governmental authorities. Meanwhile, the provincial sub-prefect (designated by 
the Governor of Santa Cruz), accompanied by armed bodyguards, burst into and broke 
up an INRA meeting in which the director of INRA was negotiating with a landlord to 
auction his lands off to the Guaraní.  
 
On April 4th, 2008, it was reported that a new commission led by the same INRA 
authorities and accompanied by policemen and Guaranís, was heading to the 
indigenous community of Itakuatia to proceed with land redistribution. The commission 
was attacked with sticks and stones by cattle ranchers and people hired by a local 
landlord. The violence was mainly focused on the Guaranís and the police forces and 
the police captain who escorted the commission was seriously wounded.96 
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On April 13, 2008, in the town of Cuervo, near Camiri, the most violent confrontation 
took place. A Guaraní delegation was attacked by a group of people, reportedly hired by 
regional landlords, resulting in the injury of 40 people and others being taken as 
hostages.97 Simultaneously, political authorities from the Department of Santa Cruz 
together with associations of private entrepreneurs, denounced that the land 
redistribution was aimed at expelling all non-indigenous producers from the region and 
that all resources generated by exploitation of hydrocarbons throughout the department 
would be expropriated. 
 
In November 2008, the National Government passed Supreme Decree 29802, which 
mandated that estates in which servitude persisted be turned over to the state, and that 
INRA brigades resume their duties in Alto Parapetí. Landlords denounced this as land 
confiscation by governmental authorities. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
in Bolivia publicly lamented the aggressions suffered by Guaraní indigenous peoples 
and INRA authorities and Amnesty International urged landowners to break the vicious 
circle of indigenous poverty and exclusion.98 In 2011, a UN technical mission reported 
that land redistribution was paralyzed in some towns, including Itakuatia, Alto Caraparí, 
Bajo Caraparí, and Colorada.99 
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Appendix 2: Legal Framework 
 
 
Bolivian Labor Law  
 
The Labor Code, drafted in 1939 and enacted into law in 1942, only applies to the 
factory workers included in this study, as the law excludes agricultural workers from its 
sphere of protection.100 In November 2007, under the ley de trabajadores estacionales 
(law on seasonal workers), coverage of the Labor Code was extended to seasonal 
Brazil-nut harvesters. Obligatory Social Security coverage was also extended to these 
workers.101 However, other agricultural workers still remain unprotected by the Labor 
Code.   
 
The Ley Trabajo Asalariado del Beneficiado de la Castaña (the Labor Law for Salaried 
Work in Brazil-nut Processing), promulgated in December 2005, applies only to factory 
workers and not to the Brazil-nut harvesters. With reference to forced labor, that law 
prohibits payment in kind and sets a requirement of processing 35 kg of nuts daily to 
receive the national minimum wage. Workers who process less than 35 kg are paid a 
piece rate, but are not guaranteed a minimum wage. The law instituted a period of six 
months for the closure of employers' grocery stores, but paradoxically, allowed for up to 
20 percent of workers' salaries to be used to purchase consumer goods from company 
stores. These company stores are have been used as a way for employers to subject 
workers to debt bondage. It also prohibits the employment of children younger than 14 
years of age. As demonstrated in this study, this law is undermined by poor compliance.  
 
 
Laws on Forced Labor and Human Trafficking  
 
In November 1990, Bolivia ratified ILO Convention No. 105 on the abolition of forced 
labor and in May 2005, it ratified Convention No. 29 on forced labor.102 In July 1991, 
Bolivia ratified ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent 
Countries.103 In November 1993, it ratified the American Convention on Human Rights, 
which explicitly states that no one can be held in slavery or servitude. The 
Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions 
and Practices Similar to Slavery was ratified by Law No. 2116 on September 11, 2000.  
Article 1 states that “Each of the States' Parties to this Convention shall take all 
practicable and necessary legislative and other measures to bring about progressively 
and as soon as possible the complete abolition or abandonment of the following 
institutions and practices, where they still exist and whether or not they are covered by 
the definition of slavery contained in article 1 of the Slavery Convention.‖104 
 
The newly adopted Political Constitution (Constitución Política del Estado - CPE) 
transformed Bolivia from a Republic to a Plurinational State. The CPE prohibits all forms 
of forced labor, or any other analogous forms of exploitation that require a person to 
perform work without his or her consent and/or without fair compensation.105 This 
Constitution also prohibits the exploitation of children and states that productive 
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activities undertaken by children and adolescents should be aimed at their development 
as citizens.106  
 
Supreme Decree No. 29894 of February 7, 2009, which created the Organizational 
Structure of the Executive Branch of the Plurinational State, clarified the functions and 
jurisdiction of the Minister of Labor, Employment and Social Security, and the functions 
and jurisdiction of the Vice-Minister of Labor and Social Security, and the Vice-Minister 
of Employment, Civil Service and Cooperatives. Among their assigned functions is the 
eradication of forced labor or analogous forms of exploitation and servitude. Similarly, 
the powers of the Vice-Ministry of Labor and Social Security include the coordination 
and development of policies for the eradication of all forms of servitude.  
 
Criminal laws on trafficking currently in effect include Law No. 3325 of January 18, 2006 
"Trafficking in Persons and Related Crimes," and Law No. 3326 of January 18, 2006, 
which created the crime of Forced Disappearance of Persons. Laws on trafficking 
includes penalties of imprisonment of eight to 12 years for persons who induce, 
encourage, or carry out the transfer, recruitment, detention, or reception of people, 
inside or outside of Bolivia for slavery or analogous practices, commercial sexual 
exploitation, or labor exploitation.107 They also make explicit reference to migrant 
smuggling and related offenses.108  
 
The June 2010, Judicial Branch Law (Ley del Órgano Judicial) establishes the Judicial 
Branch's jurisdiction including in matters pertaining to violations of the Labor Code.109 
The Law also recognizes peasant and indigenous groups' legal jurisdiction and 
establishes the validity and the exercise of their judicial functions. This is based on the 
Plurinational character of Bolivia; on the right of nations and peasant indigenous 
peoples to self-determination, autonomy, and self-government; and on rights recognized 
by the Constitution, ILO Convention 169, and the United Nations Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Under this law, people who owned land on which workers 
were subjected to servitude and their representatives are prohibited from being 
members of Agro-Environmental Courts. Among the powers granted to these courts is 
the responsibility of redistributing land that is not being used for production or on which 
systems of servitude, slavery, or conditions analogous to slavery exist.  
 
The Government led by Carlos Mesa issued Supreme Decree 23.159 in May 2005.  
This decree provides a definition of families in captivity or bound to their employers and 
provides for the registry of these families in order to grant them land and financing for 
the purchase of land to meet household needs.110 
 
 
Laws on Child Labor 
 
The Child and Adolescent Code sets a minimum age for child labor and includes 
provisions regulating hazardous labor among minors. Under the Code, children under 
the age of 14 are prohibited from working and all minors under the age of 18 must 
obtain permission from government authorities or their parents before engaging in work. 
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Employers are required by the Code to grant time off for education to adolescent 
workers between the ages of 14 and 17 who have not completed their schooling. Minors 
under the age of 18 are prohibited by the Code from engaging in hazardous work, 
including underground or night work, work involving pesticides or carrying excessive 
loads, and the harvesting of Brazil-nuts, sugarcane, or cotton.  
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire-Self-Employed Harvesters-Brazil-Nuts 
 
1 Is there enough privacy YES NO
3 Gender M F
4 Date of birth Day Month Year
5 Are you currently in a relationship YES NO
6 You are: Single living with someone
married
7
8 Can you read and write YES NO
9 Until what grade did you study First and second
Third and fourth
seventh and eight
high school graduate
How many people do you support with 
your income?
higher education Years
Graduated
Fifth and sixth
high school
Degree
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10
Portuguessse
11
community
12
13
14
Week day
Aymara
distric
town
How do you get to your workplace?
Which is the nearest town?
What month do you start harvesting 
Brazil nuts?
show on map
english
other
Where do you live? show on map
What languaje do you speak (read/write?) spanish
Esse Ejja
Cavineño
Chacobo
Quechua
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15
spouse gender age
How many days have she/he worked with you in the harvest?
children 1 Gender age
How many days have they worked with you in the harvest?
children 2 Gender age
How many days have they worked with you in the harvest?
children 3 Gender age
How many days have they worked with you in the harvest?
children 4 Gender age
How many days have they worked with you in the harvest?
additional helpers 1 Gender age
How many days have they worked with you in the harvest?
2 Gender age
How many days have they worked with you in the harvest?
3 Gender age
How many days have they worked with you in the harvest?
Who comes with you to the harvest?
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How  
16 What do you do during the day?
List of the tasks and or activities
17
18
19
20
21
Activity
Do you own the land you harvest? What 
is the size of the land you own?
Time R/D
What does your spouse do while you 
work?
What do your children do while you 
work?
How do you get to the place of harvest?
How long does it take to get to the place 
of harvest?
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
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22 by purchase
by inheritance
by distribution
by court order
other
23 YES NO
24
YES NO
25
YES NO
26
27
How did you aquire this land
How often do you or can leave? (Qualitative)
Did you ever leave the harvest area?
If you leave, do you leave with your 
whole family with you?
If they did not leave with you do they 
keep working?
For how many days do you leave? (Qualitative)
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28
YES NO
Machinery
tools
Non 
tangible 
equipment
Carts
Animals Quantity
How much you 
would sell it 
for?
Did you buy something to go into the 
harvest?
How long will it 
last?
LIST Price: new Price: used
How long was it 
used  before you 
bought it?
time of use
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PRODUCT
Where do 
you buy it?
unit price
29
YES NO
30
31
YES NO
32
33
34
YES NO
35
36
If so, please describe
Do you have a means of trasportation, so 
you can transport the brazil nut?
If not, how do you transport the brazil 
nut in order to sell it? (Qualitative)
How much are you charged for the 
transportation?
Do you use any special tools to  harvest 
the Brazil nut?
quantity Market price
When you went to harvest did you check 
to see how many brazil nut trees you 
have in your land?
How many
How many fruits do you get from each 
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37
38
39
40 YES NO
41
YES NO
42
YES NO
43
44
YES NO
45
46
47
48
How many kilos/boxes/bags do you get 
from each tree?
When you sell the nut how do you sell it?
How much do you sell it 
for?
By the kilo
By the box
by the bag
(Qualitative)
Do you get paid the same price for 
everything?
how many kilos
how many kilos
Price: kilo
How much do you get paid for this kind 
of nut?
How much have you sold during this 
harvest?
Is the price always the same?
The time you went to sell has the selling 
price varied?
Do you have a selection process for the 
brazil nut?
How is this selection process?
Price: box
Price: bag
Is there a kind of Brazil nuts that is more 
expensive?
How many times have you gone out to 
sell?
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49
SI NO
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
YES NO
61
62
63
YES NO
64
Moist
Moist
Moist
Moist
Moist
Moist
Have you been paid the same all those 
times?
How much were you paid the first time?
How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell 
the first time?
How much were you paid the second 
time?
Dry Moist
Dry
Dry
Dry
Moist
Moist
How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell 
the second time?
How much were you paid the third time?
How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell 
the third time?
How much were you paid the fourth 
time?
How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell 
the fourth time?
How much were you paid the fifth time?
Dry
Dry
Moist
Did all those that harvest with you sell 
together?
If someone sold seperatly who was it?
Do you know how much he sold during 
this hravest?
How many kilos/boxes/ bags did you sell 
the fifth time?
Dry
Dry
Dry
Dry
Did you have to borrow money in order 
to buy what you required for the 
harvest?
If so, how much?
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62
63
YES NO
64
65
66 YES NO
67
YES NO
68
YES NO
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
Do you know how much he sold during 
this hravest?
Did you have to borrow money in order 
to buy what you required for the 
harvest?
How do you pay the debt?
At the end of harvest
During harvest
What happens if you don´t pay all the 
debt back?
Who lend you this money?
Did they ask for collateral?
Do you look for another job to finish 
paying the debt?
If so is the collateral returned to you 
after you pay the debt back?
Do they charge you intrests for the loan?
How much?
When do you pay the debt back?
If so, how much?
If it is by quotas, how many do you pay?
How much do you pay for each quota?
If it is a one time fee what intrest are you 
charged?
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77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84 YES NO
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
YES NO
Do you have to pay a fee to get this job?
Are you forced to work for the people 
you owe money to?
Where are you forced to work?
Do you stop working for at least one day?
If you are still harvesting, until when do 
you plan to continue
Is everyone still harvesting?
If someone left the harvest early who 
was it?
When did they leave?
Whom do you have to pay?
How much?
When did you stop harvesting?
Does everybody stop working during 
those days?
Why did they leave early?
How many days a week do you work 
harvesting the brazil nut?
Why?
To rest
holiday
To go out shopping
         to go out with the family
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92
93
YES NO
94
95
Where do you store the brazil nut?
what materials did you use to build the 
place where the brazil nut is stored?
MATERIAL PRICE
If not who stays?
Those who stay, do they keep on 
working?
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1 Is there enough privacy? YES NO
3 Gender M F
4 Date of birth Day Month Year
5 Are you in a relationship? YES NO
6 You are: single living with someone
Married
7
8 Can you read and write? YES NO
9 What school grade did you finish? First and second
third and fourth
Seventh and eight
university
How many people do you support on you income?
Fifth and sixth
high school
Years
Graduates
degree
high schoolgraduate
higher education Years
Graduates
degree
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10
Portuguesse
11
12 YES NO
13
14
15
16
17
What is you nationality?
Spanish
Esse Ejja
Cavineño
Chacobo
Quechua
Aymara
english
other
Bolivian
other
What languajes do you speak? (Can you read/write?)
Do you have a work permit?
Who brought you to the harvest?
How long does it take to get from your home to the sites where  
you harvest See map
What is the distance between your home and the sites where you 
harvest?
See map
Who paid for your fare?
Who is going to pay your return fare?
Tacana
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18
HOURS
19
20
Telephone
Radio
letters
social networks
does not communicate
other
21
daily
weekly
once a month
every two months
every three months
others
Which is the closest town to your harvest sites?
How often do you communicate with your family?
tractor
boat
small plane
cart
other
see map
Motorcycle
truck
How are you transported to the harvest sites?
TRANSPORT
on foot
How do you communicate with your family?
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22 YES NO
23
24
Telephone
Radio
letters
social networks
does not communicate
other
25
daily
weekly
once a month
every two months
every three months
others
26
once every two months
once every three months
How do you comunicate with the administrator?
How often does tranportation get to your harvest site?
How often do you communicate with him?
Do you personally know your "patron"*?
How many times did you speak to him for this harvest?
other
once a week
once every two weeks
daily
once a month
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27 YES NO
28
I am not allowed
I have no money
there are no means of transportation
other
29 YES NO
30
Verbal
Written
31 YES NO
32 checklist
33 YES NO
34
35 YES NO
36
YES No
37 Month Day
38 Month year
39 Month year
Did you have to sign any other documents other than the 
contract or a blank document?
Do you have a work contract?
Is it written or verbal?
If it is a written contract, do you have a copy?
How long does your work contract last?
If it is avalable can we check it together?
What date did you go into the harvest?
What date did you leave the harvest?
Can you leave the harvest at any time?
If not , why?
Do you have to show some kind of document at the signing?
If so, which one?
Is this document returned inmediatly?
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40
land owner
Beneficiary
contractor
other
41
Did he charge you something?
From a family member Did he charge you something?
Did he charge you something?
42
spouse gender age
children
1 gender age
2 gender age
3 gender age
4 gender age
Famer
indigenous land owner
Did it charge you something?
Did it charge you something?
Who do you work for?
How did you get this job?
Who goes with you to harvest?
daysmonths
from a friend
days
months days
months days
months days
How long did he/she work in the harvest?
How long did he/she work in the harvest?
How long did he/she work in the harvest?
months
From a contractor
from a political party
other
from the sindicate
How long did he/she work in the harvest?
How long did he/she work in the harvest?
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43 YES NO
44
45
YES NO
46
They do not recibe medical attention
47
YES NO
48 YES NO
49
50
51 YES NO
52
By kilo
by the box
by the bag
53
kilo
box
bag
On site
In case of accidents can you leave to seek medical assitance?
If not, where are you taken care of?
Did they sign work contracts too?
Did you get sick during the harvest?
Did you get medical leave?
How do you deliver the brazil nut?
How much are you paid for the :
If so, who did?
Were you taken care of?
Who took care of you?
Who covered the expenses?
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54
box
bag
55
Num.
56 YES NO
YES NO
Do you pay taxes? YES NO
If so, which ones?
57 YES NO
58
59 YES NO
60
Do you pay for retirement benefits?  (AFP)
Do you get a christmas bonus?
When you go to the harvest, do you receive an advanced payment?
If so, how much?
UNIT PRICEQUANTITY
How many kilos does the following contain?
How many times did you deliver Brazil nuts during this harvest?
TOTAL PRICE
Were you requested collateral before receiving an advance on your 
If so, what?
  P a g e  | 89 
 
 
 
 
61 YES NO
62
Good ACTUAL PRICE MARKET PRICE
63
64
YES NO
65
66
67 YES NO
68
69
YES NO
70
71
72
Checklist
73
YES NO
Are you given an "habilito" during the harvest?  (1) (1) The "habilito" is a mechanism by which workers receive an 
advance on their payment in kind during the harvest.
Who gives the "habilito" to you?
What are you given?
Do you pay any intrest for the debt?
If so, how much?
If so, how are you paying your debt?
Are you charged a fine if you donot pay back the debt on time?
If you have the copy of the settlement, can you show it to me?
If you buy tools for the harvest is this amount deducted from your 
pay?
What happens if you do not finish paying the debt?
Did you still end up owing money?
How do you pay back the debt?
If you did not manage to pay back the debt during the period 
established in your contract, how much more did you have to work?
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74
YES NO
75
YES NO
76
YES NO
77
YES NO
78
YES NO
79 YES NO
80
81
YES NO
82
83 YES NO
84
85 YES NO
86
87 YES NO
88 YES NO
89 Yes NO
90
Hour
During a day of harvest what do you do?
Activity R/D
Do you build the cabin?
Are you a member of a union?
Are you forced to be a member of the union?
Does the union make additional deductions from your pay?
Is the administrator armed during the harvest?
Has he ever threatened you for not doing your job?
Do you buy it?
Are you paid for building the cabin?
Are the materials deducted from your pay?
How many days do you work per day?
Do you rest  during the week?
If so, which day(s)
Do you work on holidays?
Are you required to pay any fees to belong to the union?
When you are harvesting where do you live?
What material do you use?
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Nº
1 Is there enough privacy YES NO
3 Gender M F
4 Date of birth Day month Year
5 Are you curretly involved in a relationship YES NO
6 You are: single Liiving with someone
married
7
8 YES NO
9
First and second higher education
third and fourth graduated
fifth and sixth university
seventh and eight graduated
high school
high school graduate
10
Spanish Tacana
Esse Ejja
Cavineño
Chácobo
11
12
ID
years
How many people do you support with you income?
Boliviana
years
What languajes do you speak?
Nationality
Do you have the following documents?
Passport
Other
Aymara
Portuguesse
English
Other
Other
Can you read and write?
What school grade did you finish?
  P a g e  | 92 
 
 
 
 
13
14 Hrs Min
15
Motorcycle bus
Taxi Other
16 Water
electricity
Sewer acces
17
Market Health center
Primary school
High school Police station
Notery
18
19 Years Months
20
transporter baker
cargo handler
packing
21 YES No
22
Show on map
District
Town
shell breaker
zone
Where do you live?
other
How long does it take to get to your workplace?
What means of transportation do you use to get to 
work?
(check list)
How long have you worked there?
Can you show me your work contract?
Did you sign a work contract?
Where do you work?
hospital
Which of the following services do you have at 
Which of the following institutions are there near your 
What is your job title in the factory?
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23
ID Birth certificate
others
24
YES No
25
YES No
26
YES No
27
YES No
28
YES NO
YES NO
YES NO
from a political party YES NO
Otro
29
30
31 Hrs Min
32 YES
NO
33
Hrs Min
34 Yes NO
Do you have free access to these documents?
Did you have to sign another document that was not 
the work contract or was blank?
What are the documents you presented during your 
interview?
How many days a week do you work?
from a family member
Do you take other breaks?
Do you have to give some kind of collateral when you 
are signing your work contract?
num. days
How did you get this job?
What time do you get in to work?
Were any of these documents withheld by the 
factory?
Do you go out to eat lunch?
How much time do you take for lunch break?
from a contrator?
How much where you charged?
did he charge you something?
did he charge you something?
did it charge you something?
Where?
Where?
did he charge you something?
from a friend
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35 Num.
36 Min
37 YES NO
38
YES NO
39
40
YES NO
41 YES NO
42
43 Hrs Min
44
45
YES NO
46
Monthly How much?
Weekly How much?
How much?
Daily How much?
47
By volume
By product
other
Why?
Can you drink water at any time?
How many?
How long is each break?
Do you have free access to the bathrooms?
Do you have to ask for permission to drink water?
Do you have to ask permision to go to the bathroom?
How often are you paid?
In money
Are you satisfied with what they are paying you?
Every two weeks
other
How are you paid?
In goods
If yes, to whom?
What time do you leave your work?
How are you paid?
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48
First
49 Kg.
50 YES NO
51
52
53
54
Every week Only when necesesary
Every month
55
56
Every day every month
Every week When im paid
every two weeks
57
YES NO
58
How often are you given these advancements ?
Do you pay intrests for the debt?
If it is in kind, do you get a voucher to pick the goods 
up?
I work at another assosiated company
With another job someplace else
Price per box
Price per bag
Price per basket
Third
They discount it from my pay
With other jobs inside the company
Where do you pick them up?
___________________________________________
What happens if ou don’t pay the debt back?
Second Fifth
Prive per kilo
Breakers
How much?
Fourth
Concerning shell breakers
How many kilos do you break daily?
Do you get advances?
Do you get them in money or in kind
How do you pay the debt?
How often do ou pay the debt
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59
YES NO
60 YES NO
61
62 YES NO
63
YES NO
64
YES NO
65
YES NO
66
YES NO
67
YES NO
68
YES NO
69 YES NO
70 YES NO
71 YES NO
72
YES NO
73
YES NO
74
YES NO
75
YES NO
76
YES NO
How much?
___________________________________________
with a weapon or with something else?
Do you know of anyone who was ever threatened
Are you aware of anyone who has not fulfilled 
his/her work contract?
Do you have to pay to be a member?
What are the benefits of belonging to the union?
(Qualitative)
Do the workers have a union?
Do the workers have any other kind of association?
Have you seen a child working at the factory?
(Qualitative)
Have the administrators or those in charge ever 
beaten anybody?
Are you afraid someone might hurt you?
Are you aware of anyone the company does not want 
to hire?
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
Do you or did you have a compliant about the 
company?
Are you forced to be a member?
Are there black lists in the company?
Do you know of anyone who had sexual relations to 
get this job?
Have you ever seen the administrator or anybody in 
charge armed?
Have you ever been threatened?
Are you afraid of something?
Do you belong to this union?
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77 YES NO
78
YES NO
79
YES NO
80
The doctor No one
The nurse other
81
82
83 YES NO
84 YES NO
85
YES NO
86
YES NO
87
YES NO
88 YES NO
89 YES NO
90
YES NO
91
YES NO
92
YES NO
93
Phone
By cellphones
Is it against the rules to take something into the 
factory?
we are not allowed
(Qualitative)
Was your complaint adressed and taken care of?
Who covered the expenses?
Where were you taken care of?
Who took care of you?
Is there a medical office inside the factory?
The company
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
Are you given a body check upon entering and exiting 
the factory?
Is it against the rules to take sometihing from the 
factory?
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
If for any reazon you needed to leave you job, would 
you be allowed?
Is there security personel present in the factory?
Are they armed?
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
Were you given medical leave?
Are the bathrooms hygienic?
(Qualitative)
Have you ever got sick as a consequence of your job 
or for working too much? 
Can you leave your work area at any time?
When you are working inside the factory how do you communicate with your family?
I did
Did you suffer any kind of accident inside the 
factory?
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94
YES NO
95 YES NO
96 YES NO
97 YES NO
98
YES NO
99
YES NO
100
YES NO
101
The administrator
The one in charge
102 YES NO
103 YES NO
104 YES NO
Others
Do you get vacation?
Do you get a christmas bonus?
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
Have you ever stayed to work late?
Do you work on holidays?
Do you get paid for those extra hours?
Do you have medical insurance?
(Qualitative)
those who work with me?
Do you get bonuses?
If yes, who?
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
(Qualitative)
¿Do you pay to the AFP (Administrator of pension 
funds)?
Do you have maternity and breast feeding insurance?
Has anyone ever yelled at you at work?
(Qualitative)
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Peanuts 
 
 
 
 
 
Año
Lugar Comunidad
Municipio Suficiente privacidad Si No
Si No
Trabaja usted con … Maíz Maní Ganado Bovino
1 ¿Cuál es su nombre? 2 Sexo M F 3 Edad años
4 Fecha de Nacimiento
5 Si No
6 Hasta que curso estudiaste?
7
8
Si No Si No Si No
1
2
3
4
5
9 Contratas gente para que te ayude? Si Cuantos? No
10 Si es si cuanto les pagas 
11 ¿Que herramientas util izas para trabajar? 12 ¿Qué animales, tractores u otros vehículos usa para trabajar?
¿Cuánto paga 
por el alquiler 
por el tiempo 
que lo alquila?
¿Hace 
cuántos 
años que 
lo 
compró?
Si es 
alquilado 
¿por Cuánto 
tiempo lo 
alquila?
Conviviendo? Casado/a?Soltero/a? Divorciado/a?
Cualitativas
Por favor hagamos una lista de todas las personas de tu familia y de las personas que te ayudan a trabajar. Me va usted a decir ¿cómo se llama?, ¿qué es de 
usted si es su pariente o si no es su pariente?, ¿qué edad tienen?, vamos a anotar si es hombre o mujer, y si  trabaja o no en la producción de maíz, maní o 
ganado bovino.  
Nombre Parentesco Edad Sexo
Trabaja en la producción de:
Día Mes Año
¿Qué herramientas 
usas?
¿Cuántas 
usa?
¿Qué tipo de 
animal o 
vehículo 
usa?
¿Cuá
ntos 
usa?
Es propio 
¿sí o no?
Es 
alquilad
o ¿si o 
no?
¿En Cuánto 
has 
comprado si 
es propio?
Estamos haciendo una encuesta para mejorar las condiciones de trabajo en la región, la información que nos de es 
confidencial y nadie va a saber que usted ha sido la persona que no las ha dado, por que se va a mezclar con la 
información que nos están dando muchas otras personas.  ¿está usted de acuerdo en participar?
Identificación de la encuesta
Día Mes
Clave del encuestador Fecha
Cualitativas
¿Sabes leer y escribir?
Maní Ganado Bovino
Viudo/a?
Maíz
¿A que precio 
ha comprado 
cada una?
¿Estás
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13 Si No
14 Cuanto has comprado 15 Cuanto te ha costado
16 ¿Has comprado abono? Si Cuanto te costo No
17 ¿Has comprado herbicida? Si Cuanto te costo No
18 ¿Has comprado plaguicida? Si Cuanto te costo No
19
20
21
22
23
24
25 mía
Arrendada Cuanto pagas de alquiler por todas las hectareas?
deudas
26 Si No
27 Si Cuanto No
deudas
28 Como le pagas? Acabaste de pagarle? Si No
servidumbre deudas
29 Si No
30 ¿Tienes ganado mejorado o de raza cebú? Si Cuanto No
31 ¿Tienes ganado mestizo? Si No
32
Arrendada Cuanto pagas de alquiler por todas las hectareas?
33 Si No
34 Como les pagas Cada cuanto
35 Si No
36 37
38 Si Cuantos? No
39 (al mes vacunas, sal, otras)
40
Si No
¿Perteneces a alguna asociación de trabajadores, como sindicato u 
otro tipo de organización de campesinos o indígenas?
Este año cuantas cabezas vendiste? A cuanto vendiste cada cabeza
Sacas otros productos del ganado para vender? Cual A cuanto 
lo vendes
Cuanto Propio
¿Has comprado semillas?
La tierra es tuya o arrendada
¿Para sacar tu producto fletas transporte?
A cuanto haz vendido el quintal de maní?
A cuanto haz vendido el quintal de maíz?
Cualitativas
Cuanto gastas en mantener a tu ganado?
Vendes tu ganado?
¿Contratas gente para criar tu ganado? Cuanta Gente
Cuanto
Cualitativas
Cuantos quintales de maíz haz vendido
Cuantos  quinta les  de maní haz producido
Cuantos quintales de maní haz vendido?
Cuantos  quinta les  de maíz haz producido
De quien?
¿Tienes ganado criollo?
Cualitativas
mía
Cuanto
Para la cría de ganado la tierra es tuya o arrendada?
¿Te prestaste dinero para herramientas, semillas plaguicidas abono u otros?
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41 Si No
42 Si No
43 Si No
44 Si el entrevistado es Indígena ¿Contratas gente de otros grupos indígenas? Si No
45 Por que no contratarías a alguien?
46 ¿Cuántas horas al día trabajas?
47 ¿Cuántos días a la semana trabajas?
¿Contratas mujeres para que trabajen tu tierra?
¿Pagas alguna cuota en dinero o en especie por pertenecer a ella? ¿Cuánto?
¿Te obligan a pertenecer a ella?
Cualitativas
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Peanuts 
 
Año
Si No
Si No
1 2 M F 3
4 5 Si No
6
7 (Maiz, mani, ganado)
8
9
10
11 SI NO
12
13 SI NO
14 SI NO
15 SI NO
¿Hasta que curso estudiaste?
Lugar
A que hora empiezas tu trabajo?
A que hora acabas tu trabajo?
Cuanto dura la actividad 
(dias)
¿Sabes leer y escribir?Fecha de Nacimiento
¿Cuál es su nombre? años
Clave del encuestador
Día Mes Año
Ganado Bovino
Municipio
No
* Elaborar Mapa Atrás Suficiente privacidad
Identificación de la encuesta
Día Mes
Estamos haciendo una encuesta para mejorar las condiciones de trabajo en la región, la información que nos de es 
confidencial y nadie va a saber que usted ha sido la persona que no las ha dado, por que se va a mezclar con la 
información que nos están dando muchas otras personas.  ¿está usted de acuerdo en participar?
¿Le has tenido que pagar algo para que te trajera a trabajar?
CUALITATIVAS
¿Quien te trajo a trabajar?
Fecha Comunidad
ManíMaízTrabaja usted con …
Sexo Edad
Hacienda Tierra indígena OtrosTierra Campesina¿Donde trabajas?
¿Cuál es tu trabajo en...?
En dinero
En especie
En dinero
En especie
En dinero
Actividad 
¿Puedes salir cuando lo necesitas de tu trabajo?
Si es si. ¿Cuanto le has tenido que pagar?
¿Te ha cumplido todo lo que te prometió?
CUALITATIVAS
¿El qué te ha traído a trabajar te ha hecho firmar algo?
Tipo de pago Cuanto
En dinero
En especie
En especie
En dinero
En especie
En especie
En dinero
En especie
En dinero
En especie
En dinero
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16
17 SI NO
18 SI NO
19
20
21
22 SI NO
23
24 SI NO
25
26
27
28 SI NO
29
30
Sabes de alguien que no hayan querido contratar?
CUALITATIVAS
¿Alguien recibe las cosas que te dan?
Otro
Otros
Por contrato
(Sueldo o especies)
El/Ella
CosasDinero
Si es en especie. ¿Que te dan?
¿Cuanto te pagan? Jornal 
No me dejan No tengo dinero
No hay transporte
Si es no. ¿Por qué?
¿Te castigan si sales de tu trabajo?
¿El que te ha contratado te ha hecho firmar contrato?
Otro
Dinero Especie
Cuanto te han descontado de las cosas? Cuanto
Mixto¿Como te están pagando?
Mensual
Cuanto
Quien?
Si te las da el patrón te cobra?
Si te las compras tu. Cuanto has gastado?
ESPECIE CADA CUANTO
¿Estas cosas te las cobran?
¿Si util izas herramientas, quien te las da?
Te lo da el patrón Tu los compras
¿Sigues pagando todavía? ¿Puedes terminar de pagar el próximo año?
Alguna vez no te han querido contratar? Por que?
¿Antes de entrar a trabajar te han dado dinero o cosas?
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31 SI NO
32 SI NO
33
34 SI NO
35 SI NO
36
SI NO
37 SI NO
38 SI NO
39 ¿Tu o alguno de tus compañeros sufrió algún accidente mientras trabajaba? SI NO
40
41 SI NO
42
43
44 SI NO
45
(silbidos, piropos, salidas a tomar, l levarlas a la cama)
¿Perteneces a algún sindicato, organización 
campesina, organización indígena u OTB ? CUALITATIVAS
Amenazado
Si es si. ¿Cuanto y como te lo cobran? 
¿Te has quejado?
¿Te cobran o te descuentan de lo que te pagan por vivir ahí?
¿Sabes de otra persona que le hayan hecho lo mismo?
¿Quien pago la atención?
Si es una tercera persona. ¿Te cobro?
¿Cuantos días a la semana trabajas?
Mientras trabajas. ¿Donde Vives? 
Insultado Burlado
¿Te molestan tu jefe o tus compañeros?
Gritado
Si la entrevistada es mujer
¿Te ha pegado a vos?
¿A caso no les pega?
En tu trabajo alguna vez te han …
¿Te obligan a estar en esa organización?
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Appendix 8: Worker Interview Locations 
 
Brazil-Nuts 
 
 
Brazil-Nut Harvesters Interviewed 
 
Amazon Region: 
Harvesters’ 
communities visited 
Candelari
a 
El 
Hondo 
Santa 
Maria 
Matewa 
Santa 
Ana 
7 de Julio Warnes 
Total self-
employed 
campesino 
workers 
interviewed  
Self-employed 
campesino workers 
interviewed 
15 2 10 1 1 2 10 
66 
Amazon Region: 
Harvesters’ 
communities visited 
Democrac
ia 
Buen 
futuro 
Bruno 
Recreo 
Perla 
del 
oriente 
Peninsula Antofagasta 
Espiritu 
2 
Self-employed 
campesino workers 
interviewed 
9 1 1 1 1 11 1 
Amazon Region: 
Harvesters’ 
communities visited 
Tacana 
Versall
es 
El Carmen 3 Estrellas Santa Ana 
Do not 
declare 
Total self-
employed 
indigenous 
workers 
interviewed 
Self-employed 
indigenous workers 
interviewed 
12 1 8 10 8 2 41 
Amazon Region: 
Harvesters’ 
communities visited 
Puerto 
Rico 
Puerto 
Cavino 
El Sena 
3 
Estrellas 
Fortaleza El Nacobe Cobija 
Total salaried 
workers 
interviewed 
Salaried Workers 
interviewed 
4 1 9 2 1 1 3 
74 Amazon Region: 
Harvesters’ 
communities visited 
Ballivian Bolivar Triangulo 
Riberalt
a 
Chive 
Interviewed at 
roads, buses, boats, 
and barracas 
Salaried Workers 
interviewed 
1 1 1 1 2 47 
 
 
 
 
  P a g e  | 106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Brazil-Nuts Factory Workers Interviewed 
Amazon Region: 
Brazil-nut factory 
workers’ place of 
employment 
Urkupina CAIC 
Empresa de las 
Almendras 
Beneficiadora 
Lourdes 
Beneficiadora 
Vargas 
Total factory 
workers 
interviewed 
Salaried factory 
workers interviewed 
22 3 1 1 2 
64 
Amazon Region: 
Brazil-nut factory 
workers’ place of 
employment 
Balrott 
Hermanos 
Tahuamanu 
Beneficiadora 
Blacutt 
Amazonas Empresa  Boldes 
Salaried factory 
workers interviewed 
1 15 7 2 1 
Amazon Region: 
Brazil-nut factory 
workers’ place of 
employment 
Empresa 
Greenfor 
Manutata Bowles Becerra 
Peri-urban 
neighborhoods 
of Riberalta city  
Salaried factory 
workers interviewed 
1 1 3 1 3 
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Cattle, Corn, and Peanuts 
 
Chaco 
Region: 
Cattle, Corn, and Peanut Producers Interviewed During First Field Visit 
Community 
name 
Yuki Palmarcito Chouchapea Ivo 
San 
Francisco 
Iguembito Tacurbity 
Corn 
Producers 
1 4 1 1 1 1 1 
Peanut 
Producers 
2 2 0 1 0 1 1 
Cattle 
Producers 
1 4 1 1 1 1 1 
Community 
name 
Yaire Repollar Ancahuasu Santiesteban Nilo Rioja 
Villa Vaca 
Guzman 
Itau 
Corn 
Producers 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Peanut 
Producers 
3 0 0 1 0 1 0 
Cattle 
Producers 
5 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Community 
name 
Kuruyuki Urendeiti Itacarai Taminagua 
Villa 
Esperanza 
Toterendu 
Villa 
Victoria 
Corn 
Producers 
1 1 0 1 1 2 2 
Peanut 
Producers 
0 1 2 1 0 0 0 
Cattle 
Producers 
1 1 0 1 1 2 2 
Community 
name 
Florida Yauarenda Itakarai Huacareta 
Campo 
Largo 
Navaronda Iguembe 
Corn 
Producers 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Peanut 
Producers 
0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Cattle 
Producers 
1 1 0 1 0 1 0 
Community 
name 
Ipati del ivo Boya Tacurvite Pincal 
Pirirenda 
Dorita 
Pirirenda Casa Alta 
Corn 
Producers 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Peanut 
Producers 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Cattle 
Producers 
0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
Community Pipiparireda Hacienda Itacuatia Rodeo Guaraka Carapari Hacienda 
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name de 
Huacareta 
Canada 
del 
Parapeti 
Corn 
Producers 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Peanut 
Producers 
0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Cattle 
Producers 
1 0 0 1 1 1 0 
Community 
name 
Parlamento 
Total 
number of 
workers 
interviewed 
per product 
 Corn 
Producers 
1 42 
Peanut 
Producers 
O 21 
Cattle 
Producers 
1 65 
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Appendix 9: Chart of Findings by Product 
 
Brazil-nuts 
 
Indicators 
Salaried Workers 
Self-Employed 
Workers 
x:n % x:n % 
Demographic Characteristics 
Number of 
Workers 
Interviewed: 
273 
166 of 273 61% 107 of 273 39% 
Indicators of Forced Labor 
 
Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, 
Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest 
Charges, etc.) 
 
Employer provided 
workers with food 132 of 273 48% N/A  
Deductions from pay 72 of 273 26% N/A  
 Deductions for tools 63 of 166  38% N/A  
Made enough to pay 
off debts  
 
 
128 of 166 77% 26 of 107 24% 
Were indebted  154 of 273  56% 0 0% 
Withholding and Non-Payment of Wages  
Payment of part of 
wages in kind 132 of 166 80% 0 0% 
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General Menace of Penalty 
   
Could leave when 
they wanted 97 de 166 58%  107 of 107 100%  
 
Physical Violence Against Worker or Family or Close Associates 
   
Armed guards  67 of 166  40%  0 0%  
Threatened by armed 
administrator 14 of 166  8% 0 0%  
Were screamed at  21 of 166  13% 0 0%  
Were hit or saw a 
guard or administrator 
hit someone 
23 of 166  14% 0 0%  
 
Sexual Violence 
 
Sexual violence was 
used as a threat or 
punishment 
10 of 166 6% 0 0%  
Knew of people who 
had had sexual 
relations in order to 
keep their jobs  
10 of 166 6% 0 0%  
 
Imprisonment or Other Physical Confinement 
 
Used as threat or 
punishment 39 of 166 23% 0 0%  
 
Dismissal from Current Employment   
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Used as threat or 
punishment 11 of 166 7% 0 0%  
 
Exclusion from Future Employment 
   
Used as threat or 
punishment 50 of 166 30% 0 0%  
  
Exclusion from Community and Social Life 
   
Used as threat or 
punishment 0 0%  107 of 107 100% 
 
Removal of Rights or Privileges 
 
Used as threat or 
punishment 0 0%  105 of 107 98% 
Working Hours  
Average number of 
hours per day 10   10   
Average number of 
days per week  6   6   
 
 Payment  
   
Paid part of salary in 
kind  137 of 166  83% 0 0%  
Average amount 
earned during harvest  
Salaried factory 
workers: BOB 
653 
Salaried 
harvesters: 
BOB 500 
  
Indigenous 
campesinos 
BOB 2,416  
  
Earned less than the 
national minimum 
wage 
134 of 166  81% 61 of 107  57% 
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Cattle 
Indicators 
Salaried Workers 
Self-Employed 
Workers 
x:n % x:n % 
Demographic Characteristics 
Number of Workers 
Interviewed: 233 100 of 233 43% 133 of 233 57% 
Women 31 of 100 31% 50 of 133 38% 
Men 69 of 100 69% 83 of 133 62% 
Average age 43   43   
Minors 0 0% 1 of 133 1% 
Married or in stable 
relationship  84 of 100 84% 109 of 133 82% 
Had children 38 of 100 38% 74 of 133 56% 
Average number of 
children 4   3   
Average number of years 
of schooling 5   5   
Temporary workers  100 of 100 100% 0 of 133 0% 
Indicators of Forced Labor 
Physical Confinement in the Work Location  
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Felt free to leave 92 of 100 92% 133 of 133 100% 
Restrictions on freedom of 
movement 11 of 100 5% 0 0% 
Could not walk off worksite  11 of 100 5% 0 0% 
Psychological Compulsion (Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat 
of a Penalty for Non-Compliance) 
 
Scared or frightened 9 of 100 9% 0 0% 
Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, 
Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest 
Charges, etc.) 
Used labor broker 11 of 100 11% 0 0% 
Did not sign contract with 
broker (out of those that 
used a broker) 
11 of 11 100%  N/A   
Paid to obtain employment 4 of 100 4% N/A   
Average amount paid BOB 42    N/A   
Had to borrow money  39 of 100  39% 26 of 133  20% 
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Corn 
Indicators 
Salaried Workers 
Self-Employed 
Workers 
x:n % x:n % 
Demographic Characteristics 
Number of workers 
Interviewed: 537 140 of 537 26% 397 of 537 74% 
Women 46 of 140 33% 176 of 397 44% 
Men 94 of 140 67% 221 of 397 56% 
Average age 43   43   
Minors  3 of 140 2% 9 of 397 2% 
Married or in stable 
relationship 103 of 140 74% 302 of 397 76% 
Had children 88 of 140 63% 176 of 397 44% 
Average number of children 7   7   
Average number of years of 
schooling 5   5   
Temporary workers  140 of 140 100% 0 0% 
Indicators of Forced Labor 
 
Physical Confinement in the Work Location 
Felt free to leave 93 of 140 66% 397 of 397 100% 
Restrictions on freedom of 
movement 47 of 140 34% 0 0% 
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Could not walk off worksite 47 of 140 34% 0 0% 
Psychological Compulsion (Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat 
of a Penalty for Non-Compliance) 
 
Scared or frightened 13 of 140 9% 0 0% 
Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, 
Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest 
Charges, etc.) 
Used labor broker 9 of 140 6% 0 0% 
Paid to obtain employment 5 of 140  4% 0 0%  
Average amount paid BOB 45    N/A   
Had to borrow money 55 of 140  39% 79 of 397  20% 
Average amount borrowed  BOB 466    BOB 6,000   
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Peanuts 
Indicators 
Salaried Workers 
Self-Employed 
Workers 
x:n % x:n % 
Demographic Characteristics 
Number of Workers 
Interviewed: 278  102 of 278 37% 176 of 278 63% 
Women 45 of 102 44% 79 of 176 28% 
Men 57 of 102 56% 97 of 176 35% 
Average age 43   43   
Minors 1 of 102 1% 2 of 176 1% 
Married or in stable 
relationship  45 of 102 44% 143 of 176 81% 
Had children 11 of 102 11% 91 of 176 52%  
Average number of children 4   5   
Average number of years of 
schooling 5   5   
Temporary workers  102 of 102 100% 0 0% 
Indicators of Forced Labor 
Physical Confinement in the Work Location  
Felt free to leave 86 of 102 84% 176 of 176 100% 
Restrictions on freedom of 
movement 16 of 102 16% 0 0% 
  P a g e  | 117 
Could not walk off worksite 16 of 102 16% 0 0% 
Psychological Compulsion (Order to Work, Backed up by a Credible Threat 
of a Penalty for Non-Compliance) 
 
Scared or frightened 19 of 102 19% 0 0% 
Induced Indebtedness (by Falsification of Accounts, Inflated Prices, 
Reduced Value of Goods or Services Produced, Excessive Interest 
Charges, etc.) 
Used labor broker 14 of 102 14% 0 0% 
Paid to obtain employment 4 of 102 4% 0 0% 
Average amount paid BOB 42   N/A   
Had to borrow 
money/goods 40 of 102  39% 50 of 176 28% 
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Appendix 10: Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor-Brazil-Nuts 
 
As discussed in the Methodology section, after data collection and analysis was 
completed using the 2005 ILO indicators “Forced Labor in Practice‖, Verité undertook a 
post-hoc analysis of the research findings with respect to a broader spectrum of 
indicators of forced labor presented in the ILO's 2011 publication, Hard to See, Harder 
to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labor of Adults and Children. A chart of 
these indicators follows.  
 
  Present 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f u
n
fre
e
 re
c
ru
itm
e
n
t  
Strong Indicators 
of Involuntariness 
Tradition, birth 
(birth/descent into 
'slave' or bonded 
status) 
Coercive recruitment 
(abduction, 
confinement during 
the recruitment 
process) 
Sale of the worker  
Recruitment linked 
to debt (advance or 
loan) 
Harvesters were provided with advances of overpriced 
food, supplies, and tools in the form of a habilito, which 
they had to pay back with undervalued Brazil-nuts that 
they harvested. 
Deception about the 
nature of the work 
Some workers reported that they were not informed about 
additional tasks that they would have to carry out 
Medium Indicators 
of Involuntariness 
 
Deceptive 
recruitment 
(regarding working 
conditions, content, 
or legality of 
employment 
A low percentage of workers, especially those recruited 
by labor brokers, had written contracts. Workers reported 
that they were deceived about their conditions of 
employment and earnings and that they did not have 
access to the accounting of debts and payments. 
  P a g e  | 119 
contract, housing 
and living 
conditions, legal 
documentation or 
acquisition of legal 
migrant status, job 
location or 
employer, 
wages/earnings) 
Deceptive 
recruitment through 
promises of 
marriage 
Strong Indicators 
of Menace of 
Penalty 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
Some workers reported that their identity documents were 
retained by money lenders as collateral and were not 
returned until they paid back the loans. 
Sexual violence 
Physical violence 
Other forms of 
punishment 
Removal of rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
Religious retribution 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
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Threats against 
family members 
Medium Indicators 
of Menace of 
Penalty 
 
Exclusion from 
future employment 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
Financial penalties 
Informing family, 
community, or public 
about worker's 
current situation 
(blackmail)  
 In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f w
o
rk
 a
n
d
 life
 u
n
d
e
r d
u
re
s
s
  
Strong indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Forced overtime 
(beyond legal limits) 
Harvesters reported having to work up to 16 hours per 
day during the harvest season and factory workers 
reported having to work up to 15 hours per day during the 
high season. In both of these cases some workers had to 
work excessive hours in order to make enough money to 
pay off their debts. 
Forced to work on 
call (day and night) 
Limited freedom of 
movement and 
communication 
Harvesters were extremely isolated in remote barracas 
that took an average of 18 hours to reach from their 
communities. Many workers had to remain in these 
barracas throughout the harvest season due to the 
expense of transportation. 
Degrading living 
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conditions 
Medium indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Forced engagement 
in illegal activities 
Forced to work for 
employer's private 
home or family 
Induced addiction to 
illegal substances 
Induced or inflated 
indebtedness (by 
falsification of 
accounts, inflated 
prices for 
goods/services 
purchased, reduced 
value of 
goods/services 
produced, excessive 
interest rates on 
loans, etc.) 
Harvesters were provided with advances of food, 
supplies, and tools in the form of a habilito. The prices for 
these products were higher than the market price and 
workers had to pay back the habilito by providing the 
lenders with a certain amount of Brazil-nuts. The price of 
the Brazil-nuts was set at the beginning of the harvest 
season and was generally lower than the market price, 
and there were reports of fraud in the weighing/measuring 
of the Brazil-nuts.  
 
Some factory workers were “account holders‖ who 
received advances of food and supplies from factory 
stories. These products were overpriced and workers had 
to pay them back with deductions in their wages.   
Multiple dependency 
on employer (jobs 
for relatives, 
housing, etc.) 
Harvesters depended on their employers and lenders for 
food, supplies, and tools. They were so isolated that if 
these products were not delivered they could starve to 
death. 
Pre-existence of 
dependency 
relationship with 
employer 
Being under the 
influence of 
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employer or people 
related to employer 
for non-work life  
Strong indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
Some workers reported that their identity documents were 
retained by money lenders as collateral and were not 
returned until they paid back the loans. 
Confiscation of 
mobile phones 
Further deterioration 
in working 
conditions 
Harvesters who were unable to harvest enough Brazil-
nuts to pay off their habilito reported that they could be 
made to stay on at the barracas working as maintenance 
workers or Brazil-nut transporters under worse conditions 
and for less pay. 
Isolation Some harvesters reported that they were “abandoned‖ in 
the jungles and were so physically isolated and 
transportation was employer provided or so expensive 
that they could not leave their places of work. 
Locked in workplace 
or living quarters 
Sexual violence There were reports of sexual violence and harassment. 
Physical violence There were reports of armed guards and barraca 
managers, threats of physical violence, and physical 
abuse. 
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
Harvesters who did not pay off their habilito may not 
receive a habilito the next harvest season and may be 
blacklisted. 
Violence against Some workers reported that other workers were beaten in 
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worker in front of 
other worker 
front of them. 
Removal or rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for 
indigenous or peasant communities reported that if they 
failed to provide their community leaders with a certain 
amount of Brazil-nuts they could lose their land rights. 
Religious retribution Workers reported superstitions that they could be 
“swallowed‖ by the jungle for disobeying orders. 
Constant 
surveillance 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
Withholding of 
wages 
Harvesters were not paid until the end of the harvest 
season. If in fact they earned money during the harvest 
season, many harvesters had to wait months (until their 
lender sold the Brazil-nuts that they harvested) before 
receiving payment. 
Threats against 
family members 
Workers reported threats of violence against family 
members. 
Medium indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of penalty) 
 
Dismissal Factory workers reported being threatened with dismissal. 
Exclusion from 
future employment 
Workers interviewed reported exclusion from future 
employment as a punishment, as well as the use of 
blacklists.  
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for 
indigenous or peasant communities reported that they 
could receive punishments, including expulsion from their 
communities, for failing to harvest a certain amount of 
Brazil-nuts. 
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 In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f im
p
o
s
s
ib
ility
 o
f le
a
v
in
g
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
r  
Strong indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Reduced freedom to 
terminate labor 
contract after 
training or other 
benefit paid by 
employer 
Some workers reported that they did not feel that they 
were free to leave their places of work due to debts or a 
lack of transportation.  
No freedom to 
resign in 
accordance with 
legal requirements 
Some workers reported that they did not feel that they 
were free to leave their places of work due to debts or a 
lack of transportation. 
Forced to stay 
longer than agreed 
while waiting for 
wages due 
Harvesters were not paid until the end of the harvest. 
Many harvesters were so physically isolated and 
transportation (which was only provided by the employer 
at the beginning and end of the harvest season) was so 
expensive that they could not leave until the harvest 
season was finished. 
Forced to work for 
indeterminate period 
to repay outstanding 
debt or wage 
advance 
Some harvesters were not able to pay off their habilito by 
the end of the harvest season. If this was the case, some 
of the workers were forced to stay on at the barracas 
working in other positions or at Brazil-nut processing 
factories. Among these workers, some were not able to 
pay off their habilito by the next harvest season and thus 
Extra work for 
breaching labor 
discipline 
Financial penalties 
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's 
current situation 
(blackmail) 
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fell into a cycle of debt. 
Strong indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
Confiscation of 
identify paper or 
travel documents 
Some workers reported that their identity documents were 
retained by money lenders as collateral and were not 
returned until they paid back the loans. 
Imposition of worse 
working conditions 
Workers who were unable to harvest enough Brazil-nuts to 
pay off their habilito reported that they could be made to 
stay on at the barracas working as maintenance workers 
or Brazil-nut transporters under worse conditions and for 
less pay. 
Locked in work or 
living quarters 
Sexual violence 
Physical violence There were reports of armed guards and barraca 
managers, threats of physical violence, and physical 
abuse. 
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
Harvesters depended on their employers and lenders for 
food, supplies, and tools. They were so isolated that if 
these products were not delivered they could starve to 
death. Workers reported that they were threatened with 
withholding of food and supplies. 
Removal of rights or 
benefits (including 
promotion) 
Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for 
indigenous or peasant communities reported that if they 
failed to provide their community leaders with a certain 
amount of Brazil-nuts they could lose their land rights. 
Religious retribution Harvesters reported superstitions that they could be 
“swallowed‖ by the jungle for disobeying orders. 
Under constant 
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surveillance 
Violence imposed 
on other workers in 
front of all workers 
Some workers reported that other workers were beaten in 
front of them. 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
Withholding of 
wages 
Harvesters were not paid until the end of the harvest 
season. If in fact they earned money during the harvest 
season, many harvesters had to wait months (until their 
lender sold the Brazil-nuts that they harvested) before 
receiving payment. 
Threats against 
family members 
(violence or loss of 
jobs) 
Workers reported threats of violence against family 
members. 
Medium indicators 
of penalty or 
menace or penalty 
 
Dismissal 
Exclusion from 
future employment 
Workers interviewed reported exclusion from future 
employment as a punishment, as well as the use of 
blacklists. 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
Harvesters who harvested Brazil-nuts collectively for 
indigenous or peasant communities reported that they 
could receive punishments, including expulsion from their 
communities, for failing to harvest a certain amount of 
Brazil-nuts. 
Extra work for 
breaching discipline  
Financial penalties 
Informing family, 
community or public 
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about worker's 
current situation 
(blackmail) 
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Appendix 11: Presence of ILO Indicators of Forced Labor-Cattle, Corn, 
and Peanuts  
 
As discussed in the Methodology section, after data collection and analysis was 
completed using the 2005 ILO indicators “Forced Labor in Practice‖, Verité undertook a 
post-hoc analysis of the research findings with respect to a broader spectrum of 
indicators of forced labor presented in the ILO's 2011 publication, Hard to See, Harder 
to Count: Survey Guidelines to Estimate Forced Labour of Adults and Children. A chart 
of these indicators follows.  
 
  Present 
In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f u
n
fre
e
 re
c
ru
itm
e
n
t  
Strong Indicators 
of Involuntariness 
Tradition, birth 
(birth/descent into 
'slave' or bonded 
status) 
There were some isolated reports of workers who were 
born on haciendas being held in servitude. 
Coercive recruitment 
(abduction, 
confinement during 
the recruitment 
process) 
Sale of the worker 
Recruitment linked 
to debt (advance or 
loan) 
Deception about the 
nature of the work 
 
Medium Indicators 
of Involuntariness 
 
Deceptive 
recruitment 
(regarding working 
conditions, content, 
or legality of 
employment 
Some workers reported deception about provision of food, 
payment, the time it took to carry out tasks, and the 
provision of land to plant their crops. Some workers also 
reported deception about promises to give workers land in 
exchange for back wages owed.  
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contract, housing 
and living 
conditions, legal 
documentation or 
acquisition of legal 
migrant status, job 
location or 
employer, 
wages/earnings) 
Deceptive 
recruitment through 
promises of 
marriage 
Strong Indicators 
of Menace of 
Penalty 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
Sexual violence 
Physical violence 
Other forms of 
punishment 
Removal of rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
Religious retribution 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
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Threats against 
family members 
Medium Indicators 
of Menace of 
Penalty 
 
Exclusion from 
future employment 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
Financial penalties 
Informing family, 
community, or public 
about worker's 
current situation 
(blackmail)  
 In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f w
o
rk
 a
n
d
 life
 u
n
d
e
r d
u
re
s
s
  
Strong indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Forced overtime 
(beyond legal limits) 
Forced to work on 
call (day and night) 
Some cattle workers reported that they had to be on call 
day and night during the birthing season.  
Limited freedom of 
movement and 
communication 
Some workers reported that they were not allowed to 
leave their workplaces and others reported extreme 
physical isolation. There was limited access to public or 
affordable transportation for some workers.  
Degrading living 
conditions 
Medium indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Forced engagement 
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in illegal activities 
Forced to work for 
employer's private 
home or family 
Induced addiction to 
illegal substances 
Induced or inflated 
indebtedness (by 
falsification of 
accounts, inflated 
prices for 
goods/services 
purchased, reduced 
value of 
goods/services 
produced, excessive 
interest rates on 
loans, etc.) 
Some salaried workers were provided with money, 
overpriced food and supplies as advances on their wages. 
Some workers reported that they were never able to earn 
enough to pay off their debts. 
 
Some self-employed workers received cash advances in 
exchange for a promise to provide money lenders with a 
certain amount of the milk, cheese, meat, corn, or peanuts 
at below-market prices. 
Multiple dependency 
on employer (jobs 
for relatives, 
housing, etc.) 
Some workers relied on their employers for food and 
housing. 
Pre-existence of 
dependency 
relationship with 
employer 
Being under the 
influence of 
employer or people 
related to employer 
for non-work life.  
Strong indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of penalty) 
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Denunciation to 
authorities 
Confiscation of 
identity papers or 
travel documents 
Confiscation of 
mobile phones 
Further deterioration 
in working 
conditions 
Isolation Some workers were extremely physically isolated and 
lacked access to public, regular, or affordable 
transportation. 
Locked in workplace 
or living quarters 
Sexual violence Some reports of sexual harassment and abuse were 
reported on haciendas. 
Physical violence There were reports of fear of violence, threats of violence, 
and physical abuse 
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
Violence against 
worker in front of 
other worker 
Removal or rights or 
privileges (including 
promotion) 
Religious retribution 
Constant 
surveillance 
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Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
Withholding of 
wages 
Some workers were not paid in cash, but rather in food 
and housing; some workers' payment was withheld until 
they had paid off their debts; some workers were not paid 
until they completed a certain task; and some workers 
were owed back wages for years of unpaid work that 
continued to go unpaid despite judicial orders. 
Threats against 
family members 
Medium indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of penalty) 
 
Dismissal 
Exclusion from 
future employment 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
Some indigenous workers reported that they could be 
punished, included by being expelled from their 
communities, for failing to carry out a designated amount 
of work on communal lands. 
Extra work for 
breaching labor 
discipline 
Financial penalties 
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's 
current situation 
(blackmail) 
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In
d
ic
a
to
rs
 o
f im
p
o
s
s
ib
ility
 o
f le
a
v
in
g
 e
m
p
lo
y
e
r  
Strong indicators 
of involuntariness 
 
Reduced freedom to 
terminate labor 
contract after 
training or other 
benefit paid by 
employer 
Some indebted workers reported that they felt that they 
could not leave their jobs before paying off their debts. 
No freedom to 
resign in 
accordance with 
legal requirements 
Some indebted workers reported that they felt that they 
could not leave their jobs before paying off their debts. 
Forced to stay 
longer than agreed 
while waiting for 
wages due 
Some workers reported that they were not paid until they 
completed a certain task. 
Forced to work for 
indeterminate period 
to repay outstanding 
debt or wage 
advance 
Some salaried workers were provided with money, 
overpriced food and supplies as advances on their wages. 
Some workers reported that they were never able to earn 
enough to pay off their debts. Some indebted workers 
reported that they felt that they could not leave their jobs 
before paying off their debts. 
Strong indicators 
of penalty (or 
menace of penalty) 
 
Denunciation to 
authorities 
Confiscation of 
identify paper or 
travel documents 
Imposition of worse 
working conditions 
Locked in work or 
living quarters 
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Sexual violence Some reports of sexual harassment and abuse were 
reported on haciendas. 
Physical violence There were reports of fear of violence, threats of violence, 
and physical abuse 
Other forms of 
punishment 
(deprivation of food, 
water, sleep, etc.) 
Removal of rights or 
benefits (including 
promotion) 
Religious retribution 
Under constant 
surveillance 
Violence imposed 
on other workers in 
front of all workers 
Withholding of 
assets (cash or 
other) 
Withholding of 
wages 
Some workers were not paid in cash, but rather in food 
and housing; some workers' payment was withheld until 
they had paid off their debts; some workers were not paid 
until they completed a certain task; and some workers 
were owed back wages for years of unpaid work that 
continued to go unpaid despite judicial orders. 
Threats against 
family members 
(violence or loss of 
jobs) 
Medium indicators 
of penalty or 
menace or penalty 
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Dismissal 
Exclusion from 
future employment 
Exclusion from 
community and 
social life 
Some indigenous workers reported that they could be 
punished, included by being expelled from their 
communities, for failing to carry out a designated amount 
of work on communal lands. 
Extra work for 
breaching discipline  
Financial penalties 
Informing family, 
community or public 
about worker's 
current situation 
(blackmail) 
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